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1 Introduction
Bid rigging is a pervasive problem and has been considered in a range of studies. A few examples in-
clude bid rigging in a Swedish asphalt cartel (Bergman et al., 2019), in public procurement auctions
for construction works in Japan (Ishii, 2014), of stamp dealers in New York (Asker, 2010), among
seafood processors in the US (Abrantes-Metz et al., 2006), of construction firms inKorea (Lee and Hahn,
2002), for school milk contracts in Ohio (Porter and Zona, 1999), Florida and Texas (Pesendorfer,
2000) and related to US highway construction contracts (Porter and Zona, 1993; Feinstein et al., 1985).
When firms deviate from competitive bidding and form a bid-rigging cartel, they secretly conspire
to raise prices or lower the quality of goods or services. As such, bid-rigging conspiracies directly
harm taxpayers, buyers or sellers. In order to enhance the fight against bid rigging, the OECD
recommends competition agencies to promote pro-active methods for uncovering bid-rigging car-
tels (OECD, 2014). Answering the need of competition agencies for pro-active statistical methods,
Imhof et al. (2018), Huber and Imhof (2019) and Imhof (2020) have proposed different methods for
uncovering bid-rigging cartels with screens. However, the three papers deal solely with one form
of bid rigging: Complete bid-rigging cartels. The reality is more complex, and competitive bidders
often participate in tenders in which a cartel is active. Competitive bids distort the statistical sig-
nals produced by cartels in the distribution of the bids so that conventional detection methods fail
to recognize the track of bid rigging. With competitive bids, the correct classification rate of col-
lusive and competitive tenders based on the methods suggested in the three previously mentioned
papers shrinks. This study improves on this issue by constructing a more robust detection method
obtaining a decent correct classification rate similar to Huber and Imhof (2019) even in the presence
of competitive bids.
Asmethodological contribution, our approach considers a larger set of screens thanHuber and Imhof
(2019), likely more powerful for detecting incomplete cartels. Screens are statistics derived from the
distribution of bids in a tender aiming to capture the distributional changes produced by bid rig-
ging. However, since competitive bids distort the statistical signals produced by bid rigging, screens
based on the total of bids in some tender are less effective in detecting incomplete bid-rigging cartels.
Our approach overcomes this issue by calculating screens for subgroups of bids in a tender. For this
purpose, we form all possible subgroups of three and four bids per tender and calculate screens for
each subgroup. We then calculate the mean, median, minimum and maximum of each screen for
the different subgroups within some tender. This permits restoring the original statistical signals
produced by bid rigging in presence of competitive bids. We use data from Switzerland in which the
incidence of collusive and competitive tenders is known in order to apply the screens as predictors
for collusion and assess the correct classification rate of collusive and competitive tenders. As in
Huber and Imhof (2019), we use machine learning for the optimal prediction (which does not require
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the construction of explicit structural or causal models for collusion) and focus on the random forest,
see Breiman (2001), a widely used algorithm for statistical learning (see Athey and Imbens, 2019).
We first apply ourmethod to the Ticino bid-rigging cartel (hereafter: the Ticino cartel), which was
a complete cartel involving all firms active in road construction in the canton of Ticino. The cartel
members rigged all tenders from January 1999 until the end of March 2005 (see Imhof , 2020, for
details). Since we also have the data from the post-cartel period, we use them to simulate competitive
bids that we add to the collusive tenders. We create five new datasets with the collusive tenders: The
first dataset contains one simulated competitive bid in each collusive tender. The second one includes
two simulated competitive bids in each collusive tender, and so on. This stepwise approach permits
investigating how competitive bids distort the statistical patterns of bid rigging in the distribution
of the bids. We also note that the simulation process produces competitive bids exhibiting the same
features as the bids in the post-cartel period. We compare the correct classification rate of three
methods. The first method of Imhof et al. (2018) uses two screens applied with benchmarks. The
second method of Huber and Imhof (2019) uses machine learning, namely lasso and an ensemble
method (averaging over several machine learners, namely bagged trees, random forests and neural
networks) to a range of screens in order to predict collusion. In this paper, we implement their
suggested method using random forests as machine learner. The third method, which is an original
contribution of this paper, includes summary statistics of the screens (median, mean, maximum and
minimum) calculated in all possible subgroups of bids in a tender as predictors in the random forest.
We find that the method of Imhof et al. (2018) performs poorly when the number of competitive
bids per tender increases in the data of the Ticino cartel. With three simulated competitive bids, its
correct classification rate does not perform better than flipping a coin. It is particularly unsatisfac-
tory in the case of collusive tenders, with a correct classification rate of only 15%. The method of
Huber and Imhof (2019) entails a correct classification rate between 72% and 84%, again decreasing
in the number of competitive bids added to the collusive tenders. Including summary statistics of
screens calculated for all possible subgroups of bids in a tender, as suggested in this paper, exhibits
a higher correct classification rate of 77% to 86%. We also observe that the correct classification
rate does not decrease in the number of competitive bids added to the collusive tenders. Therefore,
the relative performance of the method suggested in this paper when compared to Huber and Imhof
(2019) increases in the number of competitive bids. With five simulated competitive bids, the dif-
ference between both methods accounts for over 10 percentage points. If we consider the error rate,
defined as one minus the correct classification rate, it decreases by 43% with our approach. Cutting
the error rate almost by half is substantial with regard to the heavy legal consequences of flagging
firms as bid-rigging cartels. The detection method constructed in our paper can therefore flag both
complete and incomplete bid-rigging cartels with a decent correct classification rate.
However, the simulation exercise based on the Ticino case is limited to the purpose of examining
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the correct classification rate of different methods. It does not account for the reaction of competitive
and collusive bidders when they are aware of their reciprocal existence. In fact, competitive bidders
might try to benefit from the umbrella effect of the cartel by bidding higher than they would have in
a competitive situation (Bos and Harrington, 2010). Some may also try to join temporarily a cartel as
observed in some cases. Conversely, collusive bidders react to the presence of competitive bidders.
They might adopt a more competitive behavior by bidding more aggressively as attested in the Swiss
case of See-Gaster in which cartel participants decided together on which tender they would form a
cartel and on which they would compete. We therefore need to apply our methods to fully empirical
data to verify the performance of our simulation exercise based on the Ticino cartel.
As an important empirical contribution, we therefore consider rather unique data from two in-
vestigations of the Swiss competition commission (hereafter: COMCO): See-Gaster and Strassenbau
Graubu¨nden. Both cases were characterized by well-organized bid-rigging cartels that were for a
large share of tenders complete. However, from time to time, they faced competition from outsiders.
We mainly focus on the collusive tenders with competitive bids, and again evaluate the performance
of the three previously mentioned methods, namely the approach of Imhof et al. (2018), the method
of Huber and Imhof (2019) using a random forest, and the method suggested in this paper that in-
cludes summary statistics calculated for subgroups of bids in a tender.
We find that in See-Gaster and Graubu¨nden data, the approach of Imhof et al. (2018) again ex-
hibits a low correct classification rate which roughly amounts to 50% for incomplete cartels (collu-
sive tenders with competitive bids). Considering tenders with incomplete cartels only, the correct
classification rate is even much lower and varies between 8% and 14%. Even for complete cartels,
the correct classification rate of Imhof et al. (2018) barely improves. This result might suggest that
the benchmarks applied in Imhof et al. (2018) for detecting collusive tenders in Swiss data are gener-
ally ill-posed, due to the substantial amount of false negative predictions (incorrectly proposing the
absence of a cartel). However, benchmarks require few information to be implemented and perform
relatively well in the data of the Ticino cartel (when complete), and they therefore remain a first step
in developing screening methods for flagging cartels. Moreover, we also illustrate that one can use
the decision tree to recalibrate the benchmarks used by Imhof et al. (2018) and increase the correct
prediction rate.
Considering machine learning methods, we note that for complete cartels, there are very little
differences across approaches in terms of the correct classification rate, which amounts to 81-83%.
When competitive bidders are present, however, the correct classification rate is higher (amounting
to 67% to 84% depending on the sample) when including summary screens for subgroups of bids in
a tender than when using the screens of Huber and Imhof (2019) alone (61% to 77%). We note that
the performance of all machine learning approaches decreases in the proportion of competitive bids.
From less to more competitive bids, the correct classification rate shrinks by 16 to 17 percentage
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points for the various methods. Contrary to the simulation based on the Ticino case, this result sug-
gests that cartel participants partially endogenise the presence of competitive bidders by adopting
in some cases a more competitive behavior.
Our paper is related to other studies using screens for uncovering bid-rigging cartels. Huber and Imhof
(2019) and Imhof (2020) construct detection methods based on screens using data from Swiss bid-
rigging cases, in which they can distinguish between collusive and competitive periods. Such anal-
yses are ex-post and allow assessing the performance of the screens and detection methods. Our
paper is also an ex-post analysis and contrasts with Imhof et al. (2018), who also develop a method
based on screens, however without information on the existence of bid-rigging cartels in the data. By
constructing different self-reinforcing tests, Imhof et al. (2018) uncovered a bid-rigging cartel in the
region of See-Gaster in the canton of St Gallen. COMCO opened an investigation in 2013 essentially
based on such a statistical analysis and sanctioned the firms involved in the cartel in 2016.1 In a
broader context, our paper is also related to contributions using screens for uncovering price-fixing
conspiracies (see Abrantes-Metz et al., 2006; Esposito and Ferrero, 2006; Hueschelrath and Veith, 2011;
Jimenez and Perdiguero, 2012; Abrantes-Metz et al., 2012; Crede, 2019).
Our study is also related to further papers on detecting bid-rigging cartels, however, not rely-
ing on screens. One seminal paper is Bajari and Ye (2003), who propose two econometric tests for
classifying pairs of firms as collusive. The idea of the first test consists of verifying whether bids
are independent conditional on the costs of each firm by estimating a bidding function and test-
ing if residuals are correlated between firms. Correlation between firms would indicate that bids
are not independent and thus point to potential collusion. The second test examines if firms react
in the same way as a function of their own costs. The test verifies if estimated coefficients on cost
variables are identical for each firm. Divergent coefficients between firms could indicate potential
collusive issues. Subsequent papers apply and refine the econometric tests suggested by Bajari and Ye
(2003) (see Jakobsson, 2007; Aryal and Gabrielli, 2013; Chotibhongs and Arditi, 2012a,b; Imhof , 2017;
Bergman et al., 2019). Imhof (2017) questions the performance of the econometric tests proposed by
Bajari and Ye (2003) for detecting the Ticino cartel because the econometric tests produce too many
false negative results by failing to classify pairs of firms as collusive. Moreover, econometric tests
require data on the firm level, which are difficult to access especially if a competition agency wishes
to apply such tests ex ante. In contrast, the test by Bergman et al. (2019) only uses data from the
bid summaries2 combined with a spatial model for uncovering bid-rigging cartels in Sweden. Our
research is also related to papers analyzing the effect of bid rigging (Pesendorfer, 2000; Ishii, 2009)
and to papers investigating the change in bidding patterns when bid rigging occurs (Porter and Zona,
1See press release: https://www.weko.admin.ch/weko/fr/home/actualites/communiques-de-presse/nsb-news.msg-id-
64011.html.
2Bid summaries are the official records of a bid opening. At a fixed date, the procurement agency open all received bids
and writes a record of all the submitted bids for some specific contract. Then, the procurement agency examines all the
submitted bids in detail.
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1993, 1999). As a further relevant approach, Chassang et al. (2020) investigate the occurrence of bid
values with zero densities in the distribution of bids. Finding such gaps in the observed values of
bids, especially between the first and the second lowest bid, might point to collusive behavior as bids
with zero densities (between the two lowest bids) should not systematically occur in competitive
markets.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the bid-rigging cartels
uncovered in Switzerland from which our data are drawn. Section 3 outlines the detection methods
for flagging both complete and incomplete bid-rigging cartels. Section 4 applies our methods to a
simulation of incomplete cartels based on data from the Ticino bid-rigging cartel and as well as to
empirical data from the cases of See-Gaster and Strassenbau Graubu¨nden. Section 5 concludes.
2 Bid-Rigging Cartels and Data
The Swiss Parliament revised the federal Cartel Act and introduced a sanction regime in April 2004,
with an adaptation period of one year, alongside with a compliance program. This legislative change
helped in initiating a change in the praxis towards economic harmful bid-rigging cartels. The same
year, a strategic body of the federal administration for procurement of goods and services prepared
a questionnaire for both procurement agencies and bidding firms. One result was that all surveyed
persons declared to know the existence of bid rigging and 50% to have a concrete experience in
bid rigging.3 At the end of 2004, COMCO began to investigate the Ticino cartel and rendered its
decision in 2007. The Ticino cartel dissolved without sanctions since it stopped its illegal conduct
precisely before April 2005, after having consumed the whole adaptation period. It however stressed
the damages and mischiefs of a bid-rigging cartel with a price increase over 30% (see Imhof , 2020).
In 2008, COMCO decided to put priority to fight bid rigging with a strategy involving three pillars:
prosecution, prevention, and detection.
In the pillar prosecution, COMCO treatedmany bid-rigging cases subsequent to the Ticino cartel.
Table 1 lists the most important decisions of COMCO in bid-rigging cases and the sanctions for each
case. Initially, COMCO rendered an important decision against bid rigging every other year. From
2015 on, however, COMCO rendered a decision each year and increased sanctioning, emphasizing
the determination to prosecute bid-rigging conspiracies. This appeared necessary for disciplining
firms and deterring the formation of bid-rigging cartels.
The sanctions presented in Table 1 depend on the proven facts of misconduct in the various cases.
In Switzerland, the sanctions depend on the definition of the relevant market, which is derived from
the proven facts. Whenever COMCO only dismantles the existence of single agreements between
firms, it defines the relevant market as being restricted to the tenders in which firms have settled
3We suspect this rate to be underestimated since the bidding firms participating in a bid-rigging conspiracy might have
an incentive for misreporting.
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Table 1: Decisions of COMCO in bid-rigging cases
Decisions of COMCO (excerpt) Year Sanctions in CHF mio. Number of firms
Road asphalting in Ticino 2007 – 17
Electric Installations Bern 2009 1,2 7
Road Construction and Civil Engineering Aargau 2011 7 18
Road Construction and Civil Engineering Zurich 2013 0,5 12
Tunnel Cleaning 2015 0,16 3
Road Construction and Civil Engineering See-Gaster 2016 5 8
Construction in Val Mustair 2017 – 5
Six short Decisions in Engadine 2017 1 12
Construction in Lower Engadine 2018 7,5 7
One short Decision in Engadine 2019 0,5 3
Road construction Graubu¨nden 2019 11 12
the single agreements. However, whenever COMCO can prove a system agreement, which goes be-
yond the scope of a single tender implying contract allocation over time, then the relevant market
comprises all market activities affected by bid rigging. For example, the Ticino cartel was a system
agreement since all firms, active on the road construction and asphalting market, rigged all public
and private contracts for more than five years. In such a case, COMCO considers all the revenues in
the relevant market for sanctioning, not only in tenders for which COMCO has proved an agreement.
The Ticino cartel went unsanctioned since it stopped its illegal conduct before April 2005, but if it
had been sanctioned, the total fine would have amounted up to 30 million CHF. In the cases of road
construction in Graubu¨nden, building and civil engineering in Lower Engadine as well as road con-
struction and civil engineering in See-Gaster, COMCO proved system agreements. Unsurprisingly,
the sanctions are consistently higher than in the case of single agreements.
In parallel with the prosecution of bid rigging, COMCO repeatedly organized information ses-
sions for procurement agencies in Switzerland to increase their awareness of bid rigging. Teaching
procurement agencies how to recognize bid rigging is important since they are key players in orga-
nizing public procurement markets and may design procurement in a way that fosters competition
and decreases the risk of bid rigging. If procurement agencies demonstrate that they care about
competition and clearly stand against bid rigging, they send a clear deterrent signal toward bidders
tempted to collude. Finally, procurement agencies are a source of information for COMCO in prose-
cuting bid-rigging cartels. The information and evidence gathered by procurement agencies can lead
to the opening of an investigation. It is therefore advantageous for COMCO to make procurement
agencies aware of relevant information of bid rigging so that they can transfer them to COMCO for
assessment.
The last pillar concerns the detection of bid rigging. COMCO opens an investigation if there are
reasonable grounds to assume the existence of a bid-rigging cartel. Compliance programs, whistle-
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blowers and procurement agencies can provide insightful information leading to the opening of an
investigation. However, COMCO decided to mitigate its dependency on those sources and started to
develop statistical methods for detecting bid rigging based on screens (see Imhof et al., 2018). Based
on the latter method, COMCO opened an investigation of bid rigging in the region of See-Gaster in
2013.
Imhof et al. (2018) indicate that their screening method can detect partial cartels, as it succeeded
in dismantling the quasi-complete bid-rigging cartel in the region of See-Gaster. However, as all
firms in the road construction sector in that region were involved in the case, the term “partial cartel”
in their study does not imply incomplete bid-rigging cartels as in our paper. The cartel only con-
cerned one region out of eight regions in the canton of St. Gallen (and not the whole canton). In
our simulation that combines competitive bids with the Ticino cartel, we show that the method of
Imhof et al. (2018) is not suitable for flagging incomplete bid-rigging cartels. Considering the evolu-
tion of laws and practice of COMCO toward bid-rigging cartels, incomplete bid-rigging cartels occur
more often than well-organized and complete cartels. Therefore, if COMCO desires to reinforce the
detection pillar, it must continue to improve detection methods. The broader approach for flagging
both incomplete and complete bid-rigging cartels proposed in this paper responds to that need and
is likely of interest for competition agencies around the world.
In the empirical analyses, we use data from the three most important cases in Switzerland: the
Ticino cartel, the cartel of See-Gaster and the asphalt cartel of Graubu¨nden. After discussing pro-
curement in Switzerland, we synthetize the key aspects of procurement data in Switzerland and each
case below.
2.1 Procurement Data
Procurement agencies of cantons and cities in Switzerland follow the Agreement on Public Markets
between cantons and their own cantonal laws for public procurement. A procurement agency can
choose between four procedures: the open procedure, the procedure on invitation, the selection pro-
cedure and the discretionary procedure.4 In the construction sector, a procurement agency generally
uses either the open procedure or the procedure on invitation. The selection procedure is rare in
the construction sector and when a procurement agency tenders a contract with a discretionary pro-
cedure, its application is restrictive since the laws authorize it only under specific conditions. The
open procedure does not restrict the participation of submitting firms. In contrast, the procedure on
invitation restricts participation as the procurement agency invites only a small number of firms to
submit a bid, in general three to five firms. This changes the nature of competition, as the firms are
4The selection procedure allows procurement agency to select and qualify a set of bidders for participating in a tender.
This procedure is useful when bidders are too numerous as for example in architecture designing where hundreds of
architects are interested in submitting to the project. However, such a high number of bidders are rarely a problem in the
construction sector.
7
aware of the restricted number of potential competitors.
A procurement agency announces future contracts along with the deadline for submitting bids
(varying according to the procedure) in an official journal. If a firm is interested in submitting,
the procurement agency provides the firm with all the relevant documents or information for the
contract. Between the time of the announcement and the deadline, firms prepare their bids for
submission. If they occur, then collusive agreements between firms are typically made during this
period.
At a pre-announced date, the procurement agency gathers the incoming bids for the contract and
opens them. It officially records all the bids received on time in a bid summary or so-called official
record of the bid opening. The procurement agency registers the names of the firms, their addresses
and their bids. After having written the official record of the bid opening, the procurement agency
proceeds with the detailed examination of the bids. In the awarding of the contract, the agency does
not only consider the price of the bids, but also other criteria as the quality, references, environmental
or social aspects might play a role. However, as contracts are relatively homogeneous in the construc-
tion sector, especially in the road construction and the related civil engineering, the price remains the
most important criterion for awarding the contract in practice. Furthermore, the differences in firms’
criteria other than the price are typically small. We therefore consider the procurement process as
an almost first-price sealed-bid auction.
2.2 The Ticino Cartel
The Ticino cartel started in January 1999 and dissolved itself at the end of March 2005, precisely
when the adaptation year to the new cartel Act, entered in force in April 2004, terminated. The
cartel was well-organized with a convention of two pages explaining the rules to follow (see Imhof ,
2020). All firms active in the road construction sector participated in the cartel and rigged all pub-
lic tenders and all private contracts above 20’000 CHF.5 The convention allocated contracts among
cartel participants according to different criteria. The first criterion was revenue, putting cartel par-
ticipants with many contracts recently attributed at the bottom of a priority list for allocating new
contracts that was updated each week, and those with few contracts at the top. The geographic dis-
tance between the firm and the location of the contract was the second most important criterion and
played an important role in the decision of allocating small contracts. Ties with private clients was
an important criterion in the attribution of private contracts. In particular, cartel participants that
had already produced a quote for some private client were privileged. After allocating contracts,
cartel participants decided on the price of the bid that the designated winner by the cartel should
submit. COMCO stated in its decision that the Ticino cartel roused prices by 30% for contracts in
5Approximatively 23’500 USA dollars given an exchange rate of 0.85 (indirect quotation) in March 2005.
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the road construction and asphalting market.6
We consider data from the cartel and the post-cartel periods. Table 2 summarizes key information
about contracts with four or more bids in our sample. We observe 149 tenders in the collusive period,
whose value amounts up to 160 million CHF. In total, we recorded 974 bids for the collusive period,
henceforth referred to as collusive bids. For the post-cartel period, we observe only 33 tenders,
accounting for a value of 23 million CHF, in which firms submitted 222 competitive bids.
Table 2: Overview sample Ticino cartel
Tenders in the cartel period 149
Volume of the collusive tenders in mio CHF 160.7
Collusive bids 974
Tenders in the post-cartel period 33
Volume of the competitive tenders in mio CHF 22.79
Competitive bids 222
Figure 1 visualizes the distribution of tenders for a predetermined number of bids. In either
periods, most of the tenders consist of 4 to 8 bids (see also Table 14 in Appendix). Table 3 provides the
empirical distribution of the bids for each period. Both periods contain contracts of different values
varying from several tens of CHF to up 3 to 5 million CHF. The mean and the median of the cartel
period are superior to those of the post-cartel period. In either periods, the contract values exhibit
higher means than medians, indicating a right-skewed distribution with outliers of comparably high
contract values.
Figure 1: Distribution of tenders for a predetermined number of bids for the Ticino data
6For the decision of COMCO, see Strassenbela¨ge Tessin (LPC 2008-1, pp. 85-112).
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Table 3: Empirical distributions of collusive and competitive bids in the Ticino data
Cartel period Post-cartel Period
Mean 1.08 0.69
Std 1.01 0.75
Min 0.02 0.04
Lower Q. 0.36 0.25
Median 0.78 0.44
Upper Q. 1.47 0.68
Max 4.85 2.95
N 149 33
Note: “Mean”, “Std”, “Min”, “Lower Q.”, “Median”, “Upper Q.”, “Max”, and “N” denote the mean, standard deviation,
minimum, lower quartile, median, upper quartile, maximum, and number of observations, respectively.
2.3 The Cartel in See-Gaster
COMCO opened its investigation against six firms in the region of See-Gaster mainly because of a
statistical investigation based on the procurement data from 2004 to 2010, which were provided by
the canton of St. Gallen (see Imhof et al., 2018).7 Six months later, COMCO extended the investiga-
tion to two additional firms, undetected by Imhof et al. (2018). One firm did not bid in tenders of the
canton of St. Gallen and had therefore not been detected previously. The second firm was small such
that its participation in conspicuous contracts was insufficient for being flagged as potential cartel
candidate.
In total, eight firms participated in bid-rigging conspiracies in the region of See-Gaster, includ-
ing the district of See-Gaster in the canton of St. Gallen and the districts of March and Ho¨fe in the
canton of Schwyz.8 Cartel participants regularly met once or twice per month. In their meetings,
they mainly discussed about future contracts tendered, including road construction, asphalting and
civil engineering, and exchanged their interest for them. Before each meeting, one cartel participant
sent an actualized table to all others, listing all future contracts in the region of See-Gaster. Each
cartel participant had a column and could put a star for each contract if interested in obtaining the
contract or two stars in the case of very high interest.9 When the tender procedure for a contract
started, the cartel typically designated the cartel participant who should win the contract. The allo-
cation mechanism was based on the interests announced and fairness in terms of allocation among
participants for insuring cartel stability.10 Besides, when two cartel participants had put two stars
for a specific contract, they possibly formed a consortium for sharing the contract and the other
7Report release: See the decision Bauleistung See-Gaster: Verfu¨gung vom 8. Juli 2016, available on the following internet
page: https://www.weko.admin.ch/weko/fr/home/actualites/dernieres-decisions.html.
8See the decision Bauleistung See-Gaster: Verfu¨gung vom 8. Juli 2016, available on the following internet page:
https://www.weko.admin.ch/weko/fr/home/actualites/dernieres-decisions.html.
9See the decision Bauleistung See-Gaster, R. 809 ff.
10See the decision Bauleistung See-Gaster, R 587, R 608 and R 623.
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participants covered the consortium.11
The cartel took the decision of contract allocation during themeetings in which they discussed the
list, but organized separate meetings for discussing the price of the bids.12 One reason for separate
meetings is that not all cartel participants were interested in fixing the price since some did not
necessarily participate in the tender. Second, discussions about price could have taken too much
time such that the cartel preferred the designated winner to invite the other bidders to a separate
meeting for discussing the price. COMCO found some evidence that the cartel from time to time
used the mechanism of the mean for determining the bid of the designated winner,13 which implies
that the latter had to submit either his own bid or the mean of all exchanged bids in the separate
meetings. With such a mechanism, the designated winner had some incentive to provide a relatively
high bid to influence the calculatedmean in the separatemeeting. All other cartel participants whose
announced bids were below the mean or below the bid of the winner increased their bids to cover
the designated winner. They generally ensured a minimal price difference of 2-3% between the bid
of the designated winner and their bids.14
Finally, the cartel also decided about contracts free for competitive bidding.15 This decision was
also determined by the presence of external bidders. The more external bidders, the smaller was the
incentive to collude because the chances of success were lower. This was the case for some contracts
of high value, for which more non-cartel firms were interested in bidding. Sometimes, the cartel also
tried including such external firms in the agreement.
In June 2009, the cartel stopped its illegal conduct after COMCO launched house searches in the
canton of Aargau, which to a certain extent explained the breakdown of the cartel. In its decision,
COMCO attested that the cartel had discussed more than 400 contracts in the region of See-Gaster
from 2004 to 2009 with a value of 198 million CHF. COMCO also proved that they attempted to rig
at least 200 contracts for a value of 67.5 million CHF.16 In the rendering of its decision, COMCO
sanctioned the involved firms for bid-rigging conspiracies with more than 5 million CHF. Two firms
applied to the leniency program and two other firms settled an agreement to close the case. Four
firms appealed against the decision.
2.4 The Strassenbau Cartel in Graubu¨nden
The cartel in the canton of Graubu¨nden was organized by the members of the local trade association
for road construction. The members were firms active in road construction and asphalting. COMCO
proved in its decision that the cartel participants met regularly in the investigated period from 2004
11See the decision Bauleistung See-Gaster, R 620 ff. and R. 645.
12See the decision Bauleistung See-Gaster, R. 649 ff.
13See the decision Bauleistung See-Gaster, R. 714 ff.
14See the decision Bauleistung See-Gaster, R. 714 ff. and R 718.
15See the decision Bauleistung See-Gaster, R 681 ff. and R. 815 ff.
16See the decision Bauleistung See-Gaster, R. 797 ff. and table 15.
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to the end of May 2010. The meetings called “allocation meeting” or “calculation meeting” were
mainly held in the beginning of the year since the canton and the local municipalities tendered most
of the contracts in spring.17 They discussed contracts for road construction and asphalting tendered
by the canton of Graubu¨nden and the local municipalities. Since the geography of Graubu¨nden is
profoundly marked by mountains and valleys, the cartel was divided into firms operating in the
North and South, respectively.
In the North of Graubu¨nden, the cartel mostly organized the meetings in the office of the most
important mixing plant in the canton, and to a lesser extent in the offices of cartel participants. The
meetings included either all of the 12 to 13 cartel participants18 or two different subgroups.19 In the
South, the all in all six cartel participants20 also organized such meetings, however, with alternating
locations.
COMCO stated in its press release that the cartel decided upon the allocation of contracts based
on a contingent determined for all the cartel participants in the canton of Graubu¨nden.21 The cartel
allocated contracts according to the interests of each firm and fixed the price of the designated winner
following a specific calculation method.22 The price of the designated winner was in general above
the minimal announced bid in the respective meeting. The calculation method therefore contributed
to raise the price.
During the investigated period from 2004 to the end of May 2010, the cartel allocated 70 to 80%
of the total value of the cantonal and communal road construction contracts in North and South
Graubu¨nden among its participants. The cartel approximatively rigged 650 road construction con-
tracts concerning in total 190 million of CHF of market volume.23 The cartel ceased its illegal con-
duct in summer 2010 in both the North and South, since some firms decided to stop, mainly because
arising concerns regarding the Cartel Act.24
2.5 Data from the Cases See-Gaster and Graubu¨nden
We requested data on all bid summaries from the investigations of See-Gaster and Graubu¨nden based
on the Federal Act on Freedom of Information in the Administration (Freedom of information Act,
FoIA).25 COMCO approved the request and transmitted us the data, referred to as Swiss data here-
after. They contain the bids, a running number for each contract, a dummy variable for each of the
anonymized cartel participants and a dummy variable indicating whether the tender took place in
17See the decision Strassenbau Graubu¨nden, R. 139.
18See the decision Strassenbau Graubu¨nden, R 247 ff.
19See the decision Strassenbau Graubu¨nden, R 195 ff.
20See the decision Strassenbau Graubu¨nden, R 248.
21See press release: https://www.newsd.admin.ch/newsd/message/attachments/58229.pdf.
22The online published decision Strassenbau Graubu¨nden. and the press release give for now no precision about the
calculation method.
23See press release: https://www.newsd.admin.ch/newsd/message/attachments/58229.pdf.
24See the decision Strassenbau Graubu¨nden, R 197.
25https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/20022540/index.html.
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the cartel period (taking the value 1 for cartel and 0 otherwise), a categorical variable for the con-
tract type (taking the value 1 for contracts in road construction and asphalting, 2 for mixed contracts
including road construction and civil engineering and 3 for civil engineering contracts), as well as
an anonymized date and year. The first year in our sample begins with the value of 1, the last year
ends with the value of 14. The first anonymized date equals 42 and the last 4886. To ensure the
anonymization of the bids, COMCO multiplied them with a factor between 1 and 1.2. Such a trans-
formation does not affect the calculation of the screens.
Table 4: Overview for the Swiss data
Tenders with complete cartels 310
Volume of tenders with complete cartels in million CHF 111.74
Collusive bids in tenders with complete cartels 2031
Tenders with incomplete cartels 287
Volume of tenders with incomplete cartels in million CHF 114.73
Competitive bids in tenders with incomplete cartels 650
Collusive bids in tenders with incomplete cartels 1414
Competitive tenders 2398
Volume of competitive tenders 1735.91
Competitive bids in competitive tenders 13925
Tenders for road construction and asphalting 1389
Tenders for civil engineering 1286
Tenders for mixed contracts 273
Table 4 provides key information on the Swiss data. As for the data from Ticino, we only consider
tenders with four bids ormore. In total, there are 310 tenders with complete cartels with a total value
of more than 110 million CHF and 2’031 bids submitted by the cartel participants. Furthermore,
there are 287 tenders with incomplete cartels with a total value of more than 114 million CHF. In
those tenders, cartel participants submitted 1’414 bids and external firms 650 bids. Finally, we
observe 2’398 competitive tenders with a value of roughly 1’700 million CHF and 13’925 submitted
bids.
Figure 2 visualizes the distribution of the number of bids per tender for complete cartels, incom-
plete cartels and competitive tenders, respectively. While tenders with four to seven bids dominate,
there is also a sufficient number of tenders with eight or more bids (see also Table 18 in Appendix).
Table 5 depicts the empirical distribution of the bids for each type of tenders. The empirical distribu-
tions for tenders with complete cartels and with incomplete cartels are similar. This is, however, not
the case for competitive tenders. That have many more contracts, varying from one thousand CHF
to 148 million CHF. As for the data from the Ticino cartel, all empirical distributions of the bids are
right-skewed (such that the mean is higher than the median), but stronger so for competitive tenders
than for complete and incomplete cartels.
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Figure 2: Distribution of tenders for a predetermined number of bids in the Swiss data
Table 5: Empirical distributions of bids in the Swiss data
Complete cartels Incomplete cartels Competitive tenders
Mean 0.36 0.4 0.72
Std 0.36 0.47 3.81
Min 0.03 0.02 0.001
Lower Q. 0.16 0.12 0.13
Median 0.29 0.25 0.31
Upper Q. 0.44 0.50 0.66
Max 3.45 3.46 147.73
N 310 287 2398
Note: “Mean”, “Std”, “Min”, “Lower Q.”, “Median”, “Upper Q.”, “Max”, and “N” denote the mean, standard deviation,
minimum, lower quartile, median, upper quartile, maximum, and number of observations, respectively.
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3 Detection Methods
This section outlines the suggested method to detect bid rigging. We first describe the concept of
a random forest, the machine learning algorithm used for training and testing our predictive mod-
els for collusion (see Ho, 1995; Breiman, 2001). Second, we present in detail the screens that enter
the algorithm as potential predictors. Third, we discuss five different predictive models applied to
our data that differ in terms of included screens. Finally, we provide descriptive statistics for two
important screens in each dataset.
3.1 Random Forest
We use the random forest as machine learning algorithm for predicting collusive and competitive
tenders. In our data, the outcome takes the value 1 for collusive tenders, including both incomplete
and complete bid-rigging cartels, and 0 for competitive tenders. Note that we intentionally do not
distinguish between incomplete and complete cartels, as our aim is to construct a reliable detection
method for any form of bid rigging. Tenders are therefore either collusive or competitive.
Machine learning requires randomly splitting the data into the so-called training data, used for
developing the predictive model, and the test data, used for evaluating the performance of themodel.
We randomly split the data such that the training and test data consist of 75% and 25% of the obser-
vations, respectively. The random forest is a so-called ensemble method that averages over multiple
decision trees for predicting the outcome. Tree-based methods split the predictor space (i.e. the
values the screens might take) of the training data recursively into a number of non-overlapping
regions. Each split aims at maximizing homogeneity of the dependent variable within the newly
created regions according to a goodness of fit criterion like the Gini coefficient. The latter measures
the average gain in purity (or homogeneity) of outcome values when splitting and is popular for
binary variables like our collusion dummy. Splitting is continued until the decision tree reaches a
specific stopping rule, e.g. a minimum amount of observations in a region or maximum number of
splits. Tree-based prediction of bid rigging (1) or competition (0) is based on whether collusive or
competitive tenders dominate in that region which contains the values of the screens for which the
outcome is to be predicted.
Importantly, there exists a bias-variance trade-off in out of (training) sample prediction when
using such tree-based (and other machine learning) methods w.r.t. model generality. More splits re-
duce the bias and increase the flexibility of the model specification, however, at the cost of a greater
variance in unseen data (not used for training), as the test sample, due to smaller regions. The issue
of a too large variance can be mitigated by repeatedly drawing many subsamples from the initial
training data and estimating the predictive model, i.e. the tree (or splitting) structure, in each of the
newly generated samples. In fact, a random forest consists of predicting the outcome by the majority
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rule across the individual trees, i.e. based on whether the majority of the trees estimated in the vari-
ous subsamples predict collusion or competition for specific values of the screens. A further feature
of the random forest is that at each splitting step in a specific subsample, only a random subsample
of possible predictors (i.e. screens) is considered, which reduces the correlation of tree structures
across subsamples and thus further reduces the variance of prediction. In our application, we use
the randomForest package by Breiman and Cutler (2018) for the statistical software R with growing
1’000 trees to estimate the predictive models in the training data and assess their performance in the
test data based on the correct classification rate.
We note that we repeat the random sample splitting into 75% training and 25% test data as well
as the assessment of the predictive performance in the latter 100 times. Our reported correct classi-
fication rate corresponds to the average of the correct classification rates across the 100 repetitions.
This procedure likely entails a smaller variance in the estimation of the correct classification rate
than when relying on a single random data split.
3.2 Predictors
Screens are statistics that permit analyzing economic data with the aim to flag anomalous outcomes
that suggest potential anticompetitive issues. The literature usually differentiates structural from be-
havioral screens in cartel detection (see Harrington, 2006; OECD, 2014; Froeb et al., 2014). Structural
screens focus on the factors facilitating the emergence of collusive agreements and help to identify
markets in which collusion is more likely. Among those factors, one distinguishes between market
structure, demand-related and supply-related factors (OECD, 2014). In contrast, behavioral screens
empirically measure the behavior of market participants and assess whether the observed behavior
significantly departs from competition for flagging it as a potential issue worth scrutinizing deeper.
FollowingHuber and Imhof (2019) we propose using various descriptive statistics as screens and com-
bining them with machine learning, however, not only for uncovering complete, but also incomplete
bid-rigging cartels.26 We consider three classes of screens: Variance, asymmetry and uniformity.
As variance screens, we implement the coefficient of variation (CV) and the kurtosis statistic
(KURTO), as suggested by Huber and Imhof (2019) and Imhof (2020). In addition, we also implement
the spread (SPD) of the distribution of the bids as screen.
The coefficient of variation is widely discussed in the literature (see Abrantes-Metz et al., 2006;
Esposito and Ferrero, 2006; Jimenez and Perdiguero, 2012; Abrantes-Metz et al., 2012; Imhof , 2020) and
is defined as the standard deviation divided by the arithmetic mean of all bids submitted in a tender:
26In contrast to the context of causal inference, causality goes from the dependent variable (collusion or competition) to
the predictors (screens) rather than the other way around. The incidence of collusion as explanatory variable affects the
distribution of the bids and thus the screens in causal terms. As inHuber and Imhof (2019) our prediction problem consists
of analyzing a reverse causality. By investigating the screens we infer the existence of their cause: Collusion.
16
CVt =
st
b¯t
, (1)
where st is the standard deviation and b¯t is the mean of the bids in some tender t. As coordination
and manipulation of bids by cartel participants might affect the convergence in the distribution of
the bids, we also consider the following kurtosis statistic as screen:
KURTOt =
nt(nt +1)
(nt − 1)(nt − 2)(nt − 3)
nt∑
i=1
(
bit − b¯t
st
)4 −
3(nt − 1)
3
(nt − 2)(nt − 3)
, (2)
where bit denotes the bid i in tender t, nt the number of bids in tender t, st the standard deviation
of bids, and b¯t the mean of bids in that tender. Note that we calculate the kurtosis statistic only for
tenders with four bids or more. Furthermore, we estimate the spread using the following formula:
SPDt =
bmax,t − bmin,t
bmin,t
, (3)
where bmax,t denotes the maximum bid and bmin,t the minimum bid in some tender t.
Bid rigging may produce asymmetries in the distribution of the bids and we for this reason im-
plement the following cover-bidding screens as inHuber and Imhof (2019): The percentage difference
(DIFFP), the skewness (SKEW), the relative distance (RD) and the normalized distance (RDNOR).
We also add an alternative measure for calculating the relative difference, the alternative relative
distance (RDALT).
It seems plausible that cartel participants manipulate the difference between the lowest and sec-
ond lowest bids to secure contract allocation with the designated winner by the cartel. To analyze
the difference between the two lowest bids, we use the following formula to calculate the percentage
difference:
DIFFPt =
b2t − b1t
b1t
, (4)
where b1t is the lowest bid and b2t the second lowest bid in some tender t. We also consider the
absolute difference between the first and second lowest bids Dt = b2t − b1t in the empirical analysis.
The manipulation of the bids by cartel participants might simultaneously affect both the differ-
ence between the first and second lowest bids and the differences across the losing bids. Following
Imhof et al. (2018), we calculate a relative distance (relative to a measure of dispersion) in a tender
by dividing the difference between the first and second lowest bids by the standard deviation of the
losing bids:
RDt =
b2t − b1t
slosingbids,t
, (5)
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where b1t denotes the lowest bid, b2t the second lowest bid, and st,losingbids the standard deviation
calculated among the losing bids in some tender t. In Huber and Imhof (2019) the RD was in terms
of predictive power outperformed by the difference between the second and first lowest bids divided
(or normalized) by the average of the differences between all adjacent bids. We also consider this
normalized distance in our study:
RDNORt =
b2t − b1t
(
∑nt−1
i=1,j=i+1 bjt−bit)
nt−1
, (6)
where b1t is the lowest bid, b2t the second lowest bid, nt is the number of bids and bit , bjt are adjacent
bids (in terms of price) in tender t, with bids being ordered increasing order.
We consider a further alternativemeasure for the relative distance, initially suggested by Imhof et al.
(2018):
RDALTt =
b2t − b1t
(
∑nt−1
i=2,j=i+1 bjt−bit )
nt−2
, (7)
where b1t is the lowest bid, b2t the second lowest bid, nt is the number of bids and bit , bjt are adja-
cent losing bids in a tender t, with bids being ordered increasing order. In contrast to the normalized
distance, the mean of the differences in the denominator is calculated using only losing bids. Further-
more, bid manipulation might affect the symmetry of the distribution of bids. We therefore include
the skewness as screen:
SKEWt =
nt
(nt − 1)(nt − 2)
nt∑
i=1
(
bit − b¯t
st
)3, (8)
where nt denotes the number of the bids, bit the i
th bid, st the standard deviation of the bids, and b¯t
the mean of the bids in tender t.
Finally, we consider the nonparametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic (KS) for verifying if the
bids in a tender follow a uniform distribution:
D+t =maxi (xit −
it
nt +1
),D−t =maxi (
it
nt +1
− xit),KSt =max(D
+
t ,D
−
t ), (9)
where nt is the number of bids in a tender, it the rank of a bid and xi t the standardized bid for
the ith rank in tender t. The standardized bids xi t are the bids bit divided by the standard deviation
of bids in tender t to facilitate the comparison of tenders with different contract values. We would
suspect that competitive bids are closer to a uniform distribution than collusive bids such that the
statistic should generally differ across cartels and competitive periods.
In incomplete cartels, competitive bidders distort the statistical signals produced by bid rigging
in the distribution of bids in a tender. Therefore, the screens can fail to recognize bid rigging if
calculated for all bids. We circumvent that distortion by calculating the screens not (only) for all
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bids in a tender, but for all possible subgroups of three and four bids. Table 6 gives the number
of possible subgroups of three or four bids, respectively, when the total number of bids in a tender
varies between four to ten bids.
Table 6: Example of possible subgroups for three and four bids in a tender
Bids in a tender Subgroups formed with three bids Subgroups formed with four bids
4 4 1
5 10 5
6 20 15
7 35 35
8 56 70
9 84 126
10 120 210
For instance, in a tender with a total number of six bids, we calculate the same screen but for
different 15 subgroups containing four bids and for 20 different subgroups containing three bids. In
each tender, we then include summary statistics for each screen: the mean, themedian, theminimum
and the maximum of the respective screen across the various subgroups of three or four bids. These
summary statistics are themselves used as predictive screens for flagging collusive and competitive
tenders and permit comparing tenders with different numbers of bids. We subsequently exemplify
the computation of such screens by means of the coefficient of variation for subgroups formed on
four bids.
The mean of all coefficients of variation calculated for subgroups of four bids in each tender is:
MEAN4CVt =
St∑
s=1
(
sst /b¯st
St
), (10)
where s and t denote the indices for some sub-group s and some tender t, respectively, St is the
number of all the possible subgroups of four bids in tender t and sst and b¯t are the standard deviation
and the mean of the bids, respectively. Likewise, the minimum and maximum of coefficients of
variation across subgroups in a tender correspond to, respectively:
MIN4CVt =mins
sst
b¯st
, (11)
MAX4CVt =maxs
sst
b¯st
, (12)
In order to calculate the median for subgroups of four bids in each tender, define the coefficient
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of variation in subgroup s and tender t as CVst =
sst
b¯st
and order the coefficients in so that
CV1t ≤ CV2t ≤ ... ≤ CVst ≤ ... ≤ CVSt t
. If the number of subgroups St in a tender is uneven, the median of the coefficient of variation in
tender t is calculated as follows:
MEDIAN4CVt = CV(St+1)/2,t , (13)
If the number of subgroups is even, the median corresponds to:
MEDIAN4CVt =
CVSt /2,t +CVSt /2+1,t
2
, (14)
These approaches are applied to all the screens discussed above across different tenders. Note
also that we do not calculate screens for subgroups of two bidders because of the impossibility to
calculate some screens as the RD, RDALT, RDNOR, KURTO, or SKEW. Moreover, cartel participants
were in general more than two in tenders characterized by incomplete cartels. We also renounce
calculating screens for sub-groups of five bidders or more. It makes sense only for tenders with six
bids and more to use screens calculated for subgroups of five bidders. Using tenders with six bids
or more would have restricted too much our sample and limited the application of our suggested
methods in other cases. Calculating screens for subgroups of more than five bids would have only
increased such limitation.
3.3 Model Specification
In the empirical analyses, we consider five different predictive models that vary in terms of screens
considered, as well as the method of Imhof et al. (2018). Model 1 only applies screens calculated for
all bids in a tender (rather than subgroups) as in Huber and Imhof (2019), but extends the set of pre-
dictors compared to the latter study by including the relative measure for the alternative distance
(RDALT), the spread (SPD) and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic (KS). In total, we use nine predic-
tors and exclude any screens based on the absolute bid value to consider only scale-invariant screens
in model 1. The results in Huber and Imhof (2019) suggest that scale-invariant screens work well for
predicting collusive and competitive tenders and that the value added of statistics that are sensitive
to the scale is limited. Furthermore, the transfer of a method to other cases (with possibly different
contract values) is easier if screens are scale invariant. Model 1 therefore represents the baseline
approach for detecting bid-rigging cartels based on focusing on scale-invariant screens at the tender
level.
In contrast, model 2 exclusively includes the summary statistics (mean, minimum, maximum,
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median) of the screens, which are calculated for all possible subgroups of three bids in a tender, as
predictors. In total, we consider 32 of these summary statistics applied to eight screens, namely all of
model 1 but the kurtosis (KURTO) which requires at least four bids. Model 3 uses summary statistics
of the nine screens for all possible subgroups of four bids in a tender, thus in all 36 predictors (now
including the kurtosis). Model 4 considers all predictors included in models 1, 2 and 3, this results in
77 statistics in total. Finally, model 5 additionally includes three screens that are based on absolute
bid values (and thus, not scale-invariant) as well as the number of bids in a tender (NBRBIDS),27
thus 81 predictors in total. The three value-based screens are the mean bid in a tender as proxy for
the contract value (MEANBIDS), the standard deviation of the bids in a tender (STDBIDS) and the
absolute difference between the first and the second lowest bids (D).
3.4 Descriptive Statistics for Predictors
In the appendix, we present the Tables of descriptive statistics for all the different samples used in
the empirical analyses for both the Ticino simulation and the Swiss data. We review here the most
important key information drawn from the descriptive statistics for the coefficient of variation (CV)
and the normalized distance (RDNOR). Similar interpretation can be drawn with other screens.
For the Ticino cartel, the coefficient of variation exhibits a mean of 3.25 and a median of 2.97
with a low standard deviation of 1.18 (see Table 15). This contrasts with the post-cartel period in
which the mean and the median of the coefficient of variation amount to 9.51 and 8.49, respectively,
with a larger standard deviation of 5.38 compared to the collusive period (see Table 16). If a great
majority of observations in the cartel period is below 3.83, we only find few CVs below 5.65 in the
post-cartel period considering the upper and lower quartile, respectively. For the Swiss data, we find
similar values for the cartel period with a mean of 3.66, a median of 3.29 and a standard deviation of
2.09 (see Table 19). All of them contrast with the values found for the post-cartel period (competitive
tenders) in the Swiss data with a mean of 10.12, a median of 8.45 and a standard deviation of 7.89
(see Table 20). Note that we select in the following empirical analyses only competitive tenders with
an anonymised year superior or equal to 8. Since collusive tenders are absent in the anonymised
years superior or equal to 8, we conclude that both bid-rigging cartels has collapsed in this period
called post-cartel period. It ensures that a competitive tender in the post-cartel period is really a
”competitive” one.
If we look at the coefficient of variation for the incomplete bid-rigging cartel in sample 1 of the
Swiss data, the CV is affected by the presence of competitive bids with a mean of 7.79, a median of
6.79 and a standard deviation of 3.89 (see Table 21). Looking more precisely at the minimum of all
coefficients of variation calculated for subgroups of four bids in a tender (MIN4CV), we find a mean
27The motivation for including the number of bids is that it might be easier to settle an agreement in a tender with few
bidders than with many.
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of 3.16, a median of 2.26 and a standard deviation of 2.97 for the incomplete bid-rigging cartels in
sample 1 (see Table 21). However, the MIN4CV for the competitive tenders exhibits higher values
with a mean of 6.24, a median of 4.49 and a standard deviation of 6.77 (see Table 20). Noteworthy,
the differences are weaker for the maxima of all coefficients of variation calculated for subgroups of
four bids (MAX4CV), between incomplete cartels in sample 1 (mean of 10.63, median of 9.43 and a
standard deviation of 5.46 in Table 21) and competitive tenders (mean of 12.14, median of 10.13 and
a standard deviation of 9.73 in Table 20). This example is crucial to understand the benefit delivered
by summary statistics of the screens. Even if the maxima of the coefficient of variation is high in both
cases of incomplete bid-rigging cartels and competition, the minima notably diverge and could be
used to differentiate between competition and collusion.
The normalized distance (RDNOR) take higher values in collusive periods than in competitive
periods. For example, the RDNOR exhibits a mean of 2.93 and a median of 2.72 with a standard
deviation of 1.35 for the Ticino cartel (see Table 15). In the post-cartel period, the values of the
RDNOR are lower with a mean of 1.02, a median of 0.74, and a standard deviation of 0.80 (see Table
16). Although less notable, we find a divergence in the Swiss data between collusive tenders (with
a mean of 1.38, a median of 1.24 and a standard deviation of 0.79 in Table 19) and competitive
tenders (with a mean of 1.04, a median of 0.87 and a standard deviation of 0.82 in Table 20). We find
similar values for the minima of the normalized distance (MIN4RDNOR) between incomplete bid-
rigging cartels in sample 1 (mean of 0.37, median of 0.15,standard deviation of 0.54 in Table 21) and
competitive tenders in the Swiss data (with a mean of 0.51, a median of 0.29 and a standard deviation
of 0.56 in Table 20). The values are more divergent for the maxima (MAX4RDNOR) between both
types of tenders. For the incomplete bid-rigging cartels in sample 1, we observe a mean of 2.18, a
median of 2.37 and a standard deviation of 0.68 in Table 21 contrasting with competitive periods,
which exhibit a mean of 1.62, a median of 1.74 and a standard deviation of 0.81 in Table 20. The
result indicates that the maxima of the RDNOR could be used to discriminate between incomplete
bid-rigging cartels and competition.
4 Flagging Incomplete Bid-rigging Cartels
4.1 The Ticino Simulation
We use the data from the Ticino cartel to investigate how the predictive models presented above per-
form in detecting bid-rigging cartels when competitive bids distort the statistical pattern produced
by bid rigging. Since the Ticino cartel was complete, we use the data from the competitive periods
to simulate competitive bids and progressively add them to the collusive tenders, creating five ad-
ditional datasets for the cartel period. The first dataset includes only one simulated competitive bid
in each collusive tender, the second two, and the fifth dataset includes five simulated competitive
22
bids. This stepwise approach permits investigating how different levels of partial collusion affect the
performance of each model.
We generate simulated bids from competitive bids using the following formula:
bt,simulated = b¯t(1 +
bi,drawcomp − b¯drawcomp
b¯drawcomp
), (15)
i and t are indices for bids and tenders, respectively, b¯t is the mean bid of tender t (without
the simulated bid), while bi,drawcomp and b¯drawcomp are the bid the mean bid randomly drawn from
competitive tenders, respectively. We simulate competitive bids to be added to collusive tenders in
four steps. First, we generate the normalized mean differences for all bids in competitive tenders.
Normalizing by the mean rather than the standard deviation avoids losing information about the
dispersion of the bids. In a second step, we randomly draw normalized mean differences with re-
placement from their empirical distribution in the competitive period and randomly assign them a
collusive tender. In a third step, we multiply the normalized mean difference with the mean bid in
tender t. In a fourth step, we add the mean bid of the assigned collusive tender to the normalized
mean difference of the competitive in order to simulate a competitive bid in a tender with bid rigging.
We end up with seven different datasets for the Ticino cartel: The dataset of the post-cartel period
including only competitive bids, the dataset of the collusive period including only collusive bids and
five different datasets including the collusive tenders with one to five competitive bids in each tender.
We verify if the simulated competitive bids are similar to the competitive bids of the post-cartel
period. Since we generate five simulated competitive bids for each tender in the collusive period,
we calculate the screens for those five simulated competitive bids only. We test if the screens based
on the simulated competitive bids are statistically significantly different from the competitive bids
of the post-cartel period. The results presented in the Appendix show that most statistical tests
do not reject the null hypothesis of no distributional differences, such that our simulation process
adequately generates competitive bids.
We first apply the screening methods of Imhof et al. (2018), using their benchmarks (rather than
machine learning) for classifying conspicuous tenders,28 and find a correct classification rate of
84.8% in the test data in the absence of competitive bids, see Table 7. However, when adding one
simulated competitive bid to the collusive tenders, the correct classification rate falls to 66.7%. It
continuously decreases in the number of competitive bids added such that with five competitive
bids in the collusive tenders, the method suggested by Imhof et al. (2018) does not perform better
than throwing a coin. As expected, the collusive tenders exclusively drive the decrease in the overall
correct classification rate. With the addition of only one competitive bid, the correct classification
rate among collusive tenders decreases to 48.5%. With five competitive bids, it decreases to 15.2%.
28Tenders with a CV below 6 and a RD above 1 are classified as conspicuous.
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This suggests that while the screeningmethod of Imhof et al. (2018) might be well suited for detecting
complete bid-rigging cartels, it seems inappropriate for flagging incomplete bid-rigging cartels. This
is explained by too many false negative predictions. Note that concerning the competitive tenders,
the correct classification rate of 84.8% remains unaffected since the sample of the post-cartel period
does not vary across the various simulations.
We turn now to the results for model 1, inspired byHuber and Imhof (2019), but using a larger set
of screens and the random forest as machine learner. Applied to the Ticino simulation, we find that
the correct classification rate of model 1 shrinks between 5.3 and 11.3 percentage points depending
on the number of competitive bids added to the collusive tenders. Model 4 includes the screens
calculated in all possible subgroups of three and of four bids in a tender, and with the change of the
correct classification rate varying between -6.3 and +3.1 percentage points with the occurrence of
competitive bids. Noticeably, the correct classification rate of model 4 outperforms that of model 1
in all simulated datasets. When competitive bids are absent, model 1 performs slightly better than
model 4, while, model 4 outperforms model 1 by 10.1 and 10.3 percentage points when including
four and five competitive bids, respectively. This result illustrates the gain of our approach based on
calculating the screens for subgroups of bids in a tender in terms of statistical power. Considering
the error rate, it amounts to 24.2% for model 1 such that almost one tender out of four is incorrectly
classified. In model 4, the error rate is only 13.9%. Such a decrease of 42.6% in the error rate when
compared to model 1 is substantial, especially when considering the legal consequences for firms
being flagged as a potential cartel.
Models 2 and 3 include summary statistics applied to the screens calculated in subgroups of
three and four bids, respectively. On average, model 2 performs slightly better than model 3, but the
correct classification rates are very similar. The maximumdifference in (overall) correct classification
rates across model 4 and models 2 or 3 amounts to 2.2 percentage points in the sample with three
competitive bids. Overall, the correct classification rates of models 2 and 3 thus hardly differ from
model 4.
We examine variable importance in the random forest for predicting collusive and competitive
tenders in each dataset according to the mean decrease in Gini index (hereafter: MDG) when omit-
ting the respective predictor, which ranks variables according to their predictive power. It, however,
does not allow for a direct comparison between models since the MDG depends on the number of
predictors. As we use less variables in model 1 than in model 4, the MDG of the former model is
therefore higher. For each dataset and models 1 to 4, we depict the five most important variables in
Table 8.
We observe for model 1 almost the same important predictors in all six data sets (zero to five com-
petitive bids), namely the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic (KS), the coefficient of variation (CV), the
kurtosis statistic (KURTO) and the normalized distance (RDNOR). For zero or one competitive bid,
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Table 7: Correct classification rate for the Ticino simulation
Comp.B Tenders Im. M1 M2 M3 M4
0
All 0.848 0.835 0.832 0.834 0.830
Comp. 0.848 0.816 0.811 0.806 0.811
Coll. 0.848 0.863 0.861 0.87 0.859
1
All 0.667 0.722 0.766 0.756 0.767
Comp. 0.848 0.701 0.781 0.739 0.777
Coll. 0.485 0.758 0.765 0.788 0.769
2
All 0.652 0.752 0.819 0.786 0.802
Comp. 0.848 0.751 0.856 0.786 0.832
Coll. 0.455 0.758 0.79 0.803 0.784
3
Overall 0.576 0.782 0.826 0.795 0.817
Comp 0.848 0.796 0.862 0.807 0.838
Coll. 0.303 0.775 0.804 0.793 0.806
4
All 0.561 0.727 0.808 0.832 0.828
Comp. 0.848 0.713 0.843 0.83 0.837
Coll. 0.273 0.747 0.777 0.832 0.819
5
All 0.500 0.758 0.871 0.871 0.861
Comp. 0.848 0.745 0.885 0.879 0.887
Coll. 0.152 0.778 0.837 0.862 0.837
Note: ”Comp.B”, ”Tenders”, ”Im.”, ”M1”, ”M2”, ”M3” and ”M4” denote the number of competitive bids in the collusive
tenders, the type of tenders, the results produced by the screening methods of Imhof et al. (2018), model 1, model 2, model
3 and model 4, respectively. For the type of tenders, ”All”, ”Comp.” and ”Coll.” denote the prediction for all types of
tenders, the prediction for the competitive tenders and the prediction for the collusive tenders, respectively.
also the spread (SPD) is important, which is replaced by the alternative relative distance (RDALT)
havingmore than one competitive bid. The order of importance changes with the number of compet-
itive bids. With zero or one competitive bid, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic (KS), the coefficient
of variation (CV) and the kurtosis statistic (KURTO) are the most relevant variables with a MDG
larger than three. In the presence of two or more competitive bids, the normalized distance (RD-
NOR) and the alternative distance (RDALT) exhibit a greater predictive power alongside with the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) and the kurtosis statistic (KURTO).
In models 2 to 4, the Kolmogorov-statistic (KS), the spread (SPD), the difference in percentage
(DIFFP) and the coefficient of variation (CV) are the best predictors. Contrary to model 1, screens
based on the relative distance (RDNOR, RD and RDALT) or the skewness (SKEW) are less important,
while the difference between the first and second lowest bids in percentage (DIFFP) are more impor-
tant. As in model 1, the order of the importance changes with the number of competitive bids. In
models 2 to 4 for zero and one competitive bid, the Kolmogorov-statistic (KS) is the most important
variable. Different, in the data sets with four and five competitive bids the difference in percentage
(DIFFP) comes first.
For models 2 to 4, the set of important variables changes with the number of competitive bids.
The median or mean of certain screens calculated in subgroups of three and four bids in a tender is
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most predictive in the presence of zero or one competitive bids, while the minima and the maxima of
screens dominate under a larger number of competitive bids. Intuitively, the minimum or the maxi-
mum of some screen likely excludes competitive bids if the latter distort the distribution of collusive
bids and should thus be relatively more predictive as the number of competitive bids increase. We
also note that for three or more competitive bids, the random forest mainly selects screens calculated
in subgroups of four bids in a tender (rather than three).
To sum up the results of the Ticino simulation, we find that our approach, based on screens for
subgroups of three and four bids in a tender, is able to flag bid-rigging cartels even when we add
competitive bids. When the number of competitive bids increases, the random forest puts more
weight on minima or the maxima of screens across subgroups. For models 1 to 4, the algorithm
selects a mix of screens from the three groups (variance, asymmetry and uniformity).
4.2 Application to the Swiss Data
A drawback of the simulation based on the Ticino case is that reactions of competitive and collusive
bidders, aware of their reciprocal existence, are unconsidered. For instance, collusive bidders might
adopt a more competitive behavior in the presence of competitive bidders, while the latter might
try to benefit from the umbrella effect of a cartel by bidding higher than they would have in a fully
competitive situation. We therefore apply our detection method to data of the cases See-Gaster and
Strassenbau Graubu¨nden, characterized by well-organized bid-rigging cartels that, however, faced
competition from outsiders from time to time.
We investigate the performance of our various predictive models first considering complete car-
tels. As shown in Table 9, the correct classification rates do not differ importantly across machine
learning-basedmodels 1 to 5 and amount to 81.3% to 83.3%. For the screeningmethod of Imhof et al.
(2018), the correct classification rate of 61.7% is clearly below that of models 1 to 5 and in addition
strongly differs between competitive and collusive tenders, amounting to only 33.4% in the latter
case. Possible explanations for the poor performance are the reliance on only two screens, which are
not necessarily the optimal predictors, as well as on benchmark values for these two screens from
two previous investigations, that are not necessarily optimal in the data considered. In contrast, the
machine learning approaches use a larger set of screens and weight their importance in a data-driven
way.
However, if we adjust the benchmarks in Imhof et al. (2018), we can achieve a better prediction
rate for complete cartels. In Appendix, we display a decision tree on figure 3 corresponding to
the minimal cross-validation error. Our pruned tree, using as predictors only the RD and the CV
as in Imhof et al. (2018), exhibits a correct classification rate of 81.6% for complete cartels. Since
Imhof et al. (2018) have drawn their benchmarks from two previous investigations, one of them was
the Ticino cartel, it is therefore coherent that the benchmarks produce better results for detecting
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Table 8: Important predictors for the Ticino simulation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Comp.B IV MDG IV MDG IV MDG IV MDG
0
KS 4.63 MEAN3KS 2.33 MEAN4KS 2.88 MEAN4KS 1.56
CV 4.6 MEDIAN3SPD 1.88 MEDIAN4SPD 1.89 MEAN3KS 1.37
KURTO 3.37 MEAN3SPD 1.85 MEAN4SPD 1.86 MEDIAN3SPD 0.99
SPD 2.42 MEAN3DIFFP 1.78 MEAN4CV 1.83 MEAN3SPD 0.97
RDNOR 2.36 MEAN3CV 1.74 MEDIAN4KS 1.82 MEAN3DIFFP 0.97
1
KS 3.88 MEAN3KS 1.92 MEAN4KS 2.08 MEAN3KS 1.16
KURTO 3.65 MEDIAN3SPD 1.18 MEDIAN4SPD 1.15 MEAN4KS 1.08
CV 3.61 MEAN3SPD 1.17 MEAN4SPD 1.13 MEDIAN3SPD 0.65
SPD 2.96 MEDIAN3KS 1.13 MEDIAN4CV 1.1 MEAN3SPD 0.65
RDNOR 2.72 MEAN3CV 1.08 MIN4SPD 1.08 MEDIAN3KS 0.63
2
RDNOR 4.2 MEAN3KS 1.45 MIN4DIFFP 1.45 MIN3DIFFP 0.82
RDALT 3.37 MIN3DIFFP 1.4 MEAN4KS 1.4 MEAN3KS 0.81
KS 3.1 MIN3SPD 1.14 MIN4CV 1.14 MIN4DIFFP 0.76
KURTO 2.99 MAX3KS 1.1 MIN4SPD 1.1 MEAN4KS 0.74
CV 2.92 MIN3CV 1.1 MAX4KS 1.1 RDNOR 0.72
3
RDNOR 3.67 MEAN3KS 1.64 MIN4CV 1.76 MAX4KS 0.99
KURTO 3.47 MAX3KS 1.46 MAX4KS 1.75 MIN4CV 0.99
KS 3.45 MIN3CV 1.44 MIN4SPD 1.74 MIN4SPD 0.95
RDALT 3.12 MIN3SPD 1.44 MIN4DIFFP 1.71 MEAN3KS 0.9
CV 3.08 MIN3DIFFP 1.33 MEAN4KS 1.33 MIN4DIFFP 0.89
4
KURTO 4.49 MIN3DIFFP 2.04 MIN4DIFFP 2.34 MIN4DIFFP 1.34
RDNOR 3.72 MIN3SPD 1.69 MAX4KS 2.1 MIN4CV 1.27
KS 3.16 MIN3CV 1.59 MIN4CV 2.09 MAX4KS 1.27
RDALT 2.68 MAX3KS 1.57 MIN4SPD 2.02 MIN4SPD 1.23
CV 2.52 MAX3RDNOR 1.47 MAX4RDALT 1.28 MIN3DIFFP 1.07
5
KURTO 5.08 MIN3DIFFP 2.15 MIN4DIFFP 2.44 MIN4DIFFP 1.53
RDNOR 3.87 MIN3SPD 1.62 MIN4SPD 2.31 MIN4SPD 1.51
RDALT 2.77 MAX3KS 1.52 MAX4KS 2.05 MAX4KS 1.35
KS 2.71 MIN3CV 1.5 MIN4CV 2.03 MIN4CV 1.34
CV 2.15 MEAN3KS 1.5 MAX4RDALT 1.54 MIN3DIFFP 1.06
Note: ”Comp.B”, ”IV” and ”MDG” denote the number of competitive bids in the collusive tenders, the important variables
selected by the random forest and the mean decrease in Gini index. ”KS”, ”CV”, ”SPD”, ”RD”, ”RDNOR”, ”RDALT”,
”SKEW”, ”DIFFP” and ”KURTO” denote the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic, the coefficient of variation, the spread, the
relative distance, the normalized distance, the alternative relative distance, the skewness statistic, the percentage difference
and the kurtosis statistic, respectively.
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complete bid-rigging cartels in Ticino than in the Swiss data. Such discrepancy illustrates the fun-
damental difference between a benchmark method and machine learning. Benchmarks are given
exogenous whereas machine learning outperforms benchmarks since it chooses the best predictors
in each case. If a benchmark can still be adapted to different cases, machine learning algorithms are
far more precise. Nonetheless, a benchmark method has the advantage of requiring few information
to be implemented and therefore remains a first step for flagging cartels.
Considering incomplete cartels, the correct classification rates vary between 61.2% to 84.1% de-
pending on the sample and the model. When the proportion of competitive bidders increases, the
correct predictions generally decrease, as depicted in Table 9. This result suggests that cartel partic-
ipants anticipated competitive bids and decided not to collude in some peculiar tenders, as attested
for example in the case of See-Gaster. The models with screens, calculated for subgroups outper-
form model 1. Among them, models 3 and 4 (different to the Ticino simulation) slightly outperform
model 2, indicating that in our case, screens calculated for subgroups of four bids exhibit a higher
predictive power than those calculated for subgroups of three bids. The fact that we have four car-
tel participants per tender in most cases likely explains this result. In contrast, screens calculated
for subgroups of three bids possibly work better if we mostly observe three cartel participants per
tender.
Model 5 (which is the only to also include the number of bidders or the contract value as predic-
tors) outperforms all other models and has a 5 to 10 percentage points higher correct classification
rate than model 1. The advantage of models 3 or 4 over model 1 is 3 to 5.7 percentage points. The
gain of calculating screens for subgroups is therefore not quite as high as for the Ticino simulation
(4.5 to 10.3 percentage points). The result again suggests that cartel participants anticipated com-
petitive bids and adapted their behavior, which was absent in the simulation of competitive bids for
the Ticino case. However, models 2 to 4 still outperform model 1 and therefore competition agencies
should consider screens for subgroups in the presence of incomplete bid-rigging cartels. Similar to
the Ticino simulation, the method of Imhof et al. (2018) performs poorly for flagging incomplete bid-
rigging cartels and does not better than throwing a coin. Specifically for truly collusive tenders, the
correct classification rate is only between 8.7% and 14.7%.
When looking at the variable importance as reported in Table 10, we find for all models and
samples that the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic (KS) is an important predictor. In many case, it is
among the three most important variables. Even if both collusive and competitive tenders generally
do not follow a uniform distribution, the collusive ones are generally less uniform such that the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic for deviations from the uniform distribution tends to exhibit higher
values under bid rigging.
The random forest generally picks up a balanced set of screens for the variance and asymmetry
alongwith the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic for all models in samples with incomplete cartels. How-
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ever, for complete cartels and all models except model 1, the random forest selects screens for the
variance, mainly the coefficient of variation (CV) and the spread (SPD), along with the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov statistic (KS). In model 1, the random forest picks up screens for asymmetry as the per-
centage difference (DIFFP) and the normalized distance (RDNOR). Further, the results suggest that
screens for asymmetry are less important in the case of incomplete cartels, especially if one uses the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic (KS).
For all the samples with incomplete cartels, the minima and the maxima of the screens calculated
for subgroups are the most important variables, while under complete cartels it is the mean and the
median. As for the Ticino case, the result suggests that a few competitive bids sufficiently disturb the
statistical pattern produced by bid rigging so that it becomes difficult to detect collusion by screens
based on the total of bids per tender. In contrast, the use of the minimum or the maximum of all
possible subgroups mitigates the distortion by competitive bids.
Table 9: Correct classification rate in the Swiss data
Sample Cart.F Perc.Cart.F Tenders Im. M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
0 > 1 71%
All 0.524 0.612 0.637 0.642 0.645 0.673
Comp. 0.901 0.612 0.607 0.612 0.62 0.646
Coll. 0.147 0.615 0.671 0.677 0.677 0.706
2 > 2 75%
All 0.525 0.648 0.665 0.675 0.678 0.708
Comp. 0.901 0.652 0.643 0.645 0.65 0.683
Coll. 0.148 0.647 0.691 0.71 0.709 0.737
3 > 3 79%
All 0.511 0.706 0.722 0.748 0.745 0.759
Comp. 0.901 0.705 0.688 0.705 0.707 0.719
Coll. 0.121 0.708 0.758 0.792 0.784 0.800
4 > 4 83%
All 0.506 0.743 0.770 0.8 0.798 0.814
Comp. 0.901 0.755 0.751 0.764 0.771 0.783
Coll. 0.111 0.735 0.791 0.835 0.826 0.846
5 > 5 88%
All 0.494 0.766 0.805 0.813 0.818 0.841
Comp. 0.901 0.771 0.769 0.786 0.788 0.813
Coll. 0.087 0.763 0.844 0.842 0.849 0.871
Compl.
Cartel
All 100%
All 0.617 0.826 0.813 0.82 0.823 0.833
Comp. 0.900 0.83 0.818 0.819 0.827 0.833
Coll. 0.334 0.823 0.808 0.823 0.82 0.834
Note: ”Sample”, ”Cartel.F”, ”Per.Cart.F”, ”Tenders”, ”Im.”, ”M1”, ”M2”, ”M3”, ”M4” and ”M5” denote the sample, the
number of cartel firms in the collusive tenders, the percentage of cartel firms in the collusive tenders, the type of tenders,
the results produced by the screening methods of Imhof et al. (2018), model 1, model 2, model 3, model 4 and model
5, respectively. For the type of tenders, ”All”, ”Comp.” and ”Coll.” denote the prediction for all types of tenders, the
prediction for the competitive tenders and the prediction for the collusive tenders, respectively.
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Table 10: Important predictors for the Swiss data
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Sample IV MDG IV MDG IV MDG IV MDG IV MDG
1
SKEW 22.48 MIN3CV 9.98 MIN4CV 9.87 MIN4CV 5.8 STDBIDS 5.94
RDNOR 21.73 MAX3KS 9.93 MAX4KS 9.55 MAX4KS 5.56 MEANBIDS 5.67
SPD 21.67 MIN3SPD 9.66 MIN4SPD 9.34 MIN4SPD 5.39 MIN4CV 5.27
KS 21.31 MAX3DIFFP 6.56 MIN4SKEW 8.14 MAX4RD 4.66 MAX4KS 5.11
DIFFP 20.75 MIN3DIFFP 6.47 MAX4RD 8.08 MIN4SKEW 4.61 MIN4SPD 4.92
2
KS 19.64 MIN3CV 9.27 MIN4CV 9.26 MIN4CV 5.61 MIN4CV 5.23
RDNOR 19.56 MAX3KS 9.23 MAX4KS 9.12 MAX4KS 5.54 STDBIDS 5.03
SPD 19.51 MIN3SPD 8.98 MIN4SPD 8.87 MIN4SPD 5.32 MAX4KS 5.02
SKEW 18.66 MIN3DIFFP 5.62 MAX4RD 7.71 MAX4RD 4.63 MEANBIDS 4.97
CV 18.38 MAX3DIFFP 5.51 MIN4SKEW 7.67 MIN4SKEW 4.56 MIN4SPD 4.78
3
RDNOR 16.31 MAX3KS 8.42 MIN4CV 8.32 MIN4CV 5.46 NBRBIDS 5.88
SPD 15.04 MIN3CV 8.32 MAX4KS 8.08 MAX4KS 5.43 MIN4CV 4.9
KURTO 14.62 MIN3SPD 8.2 MIN4SPD 7.52 MAX4RD 5.01 MAX4KS 4.87
KS 14.35 MAX3RD 5.09 MAX4RD 7.5 MIN4SPD 4.96 MAX4RD 4.53
RDALT 14.02 MAX3RDALT 5.09 MIN4SKEW 7.4 MIN4SKEW 4.94 MIN4SKEW 4.49
4
RDNOR 13.28 MIN3SPD 8.15 MIN4CV 7.6 MIN4CV 5.15 NBRBIDS 7.49
SPD 12.12 MAX3KS 8.13 MAX4KS 7.49 MAX4KS 5.09 MIN4CV 4.52
KS 11.52 MIN3CV 8.09 MIN4SPD 7.46 MIN4SPD 4.99 MAX4KS 4.45
RDALT 11.42 MAX3RD 4.51 MIN4SKEW 7.39 MIN4SKEW 4.96 MIN4SKEW 4.38
CV 11.06 MIN3SKEW 4.49 MAX4RD 6.92 MAX4RD 4.66 MIN4SPD 4.33
5
KS 10.35 MIN3SPD 6.43 MAX4KS 6.05 MIN4CV 4.08 NBRBIDS 7.27
SPD 10.14 MIN3CV 5.98 MIN4CV 6.05 MAX4KS 3.99 MIN4CV 3.51
CV 9.83 MAX3KS 5.94 MIN4SPD 6.02 MIN4SPD 3.96 MIN4SPD 3.4
RDNOR 9.53 MAX3RD 3.75 MIN4SKEW 5.09 MAX4RDALT 3.25 MAX4KS 3.39
RDALT 8.03 MAX3RDALT 3.74 MAX4RDALT 4.96 MAX4RDNOR 3.25 MAX4RDALT 2.86
Compl.
Cartel
KS 54.65 MEDIAN3CV 20.04 MEDIAN4KS 20.23 MEDIAN4KS 11.4 MEDIAN4KS 10.86
CV 50.9 MEDIAN3SPD 18.68 MEDIAN4SPD 20.04 MEDIAN4SPD 11.27 MEDIAN4CV 10.82
SPD 32.96 MEAN3CV 18.49 MEDIAN4CV 19.56 MEDIAN4CV 11.04 MEDIAN4SPD 10.75
DIFFP 18.37 MEDIAN3KS 18.46 MEAN4KS 16.91 MEDIAN3CV 10.29 MEDIAN3CV 9.96
RDNOR 17.1 MEAN3SPD 17.64 MEAN4CV 16.67 MEDIAN3KS 9.37 MEDIAN3SPD 9.22
Note: ”Sample”, ”IV” and ”MDG” denote the sample, the important variables selected by the random forest and the mean decrease in Gini index. ”KS”, ”CV”, ”SPD”, ”RD”, ”RD-
NOR”, ”RDALT”, ”SKEW”, ”DIFFP” and ”KURTO” denote the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic, the coefficient of variation, the spread, the relative distance, the normalized distance, the
alternative relative distance, the skewness statistic, the percentage difference and the kurtosis statistic, respectively.
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4.3 Robustness Analysis
We investigate the robustness of our correct classification rates when discarding the most important
predictors and applying the random forest to the remaining predictors. Since model 1 makes use
of fewer predictors than the other ones, we leave out the three most important variables, while for
models 2 to 5, we drop the five best predictors. Table 11 reports the difference in percentage points
in the correct classification rates when keeping vs. dropping the respective predictors.
Table 11: Differences in percentage points in correct classification rates of original random forest
minus the correct classification rates of the random forest with discarded variables
Sample Cart.F Perc.Cart.F Tenders M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
1 > 1 71%
All 3.4 1.1 -0.2 0 1.8
Comp. 3.6 -0.9 -1.2 -0.3 1.8
Coll. 3.2 3.1 0.9 0.3 1.8
2 > 2 75%
All 1.8 1.3 -0.4 0 1.4
Comp. 2.9 -0.4 -1.1 -0.3 1.4
Coll. 0.6 3 0.3 0.3 1.3
3 > 3 79%
All 4.8 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5
Comp. 6.3 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 0.1
Coll. 3.2 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.9
4 > 4 83%
All 3.4 1.2 0.2 0.9 1.8
Comp. 4.1 0.9 -0.2 0.5 0.9
Coll. 2.6 1.6 0.6 1.3 2.7
5 > 5 88%
All 0.6 2 0.2 0.2 1.7
Comp. 1.3 0.9 0.5 0.2 1.5
Coll. -0.2 3.1 -0.4 0 1.7
Compl.
Cartel
All 100%
All 1 -0.2 0.4 0 0
Comp. 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.2 -0.2
Coll. 1.3 -0.8 0.3 -0.1 0.2
Note: ”Sample”, ”Cartel.F”, ”Per.Cart.F”, ”Tenders”, ”M1”, ”M2”, ”M3”, ”M4” and ”M5” denote the sample, the number
of cartel firms in the collusive tenders, the percentage of cartel firms in the collusive tenders, the type of tenders, model
1, model 2, model 3, model 4 and model 5, respectively. For the type of tenders, ”All”, ”Comp.” and ”Coll.” denote the
prediction for all types of tenders, the prediction for the competitive tenders and the prediction for the collusive tenders,
respectively.
The overall correct classification rate of model 1 in samples 1, 3 and 4 keeping all variables dom-
inates that when dropping the best three predictors by 3.4 to 4.8 percentage points. Considering the
other models and samples, we observe more or less the same predictive power when discarding the
most important variables. This suggests that the remaining predictors seem to be good substitutes
for the discarded ones. Other variables become more important when the most important predic-
tors are omitted, and the correct classification rate is hardly affected, which is in line with previous
findings of Huber and Imhof (2019).
Furthermore, we investigate the robustness with respect to the type of contracts. For both the
cartel and post-cartel periods, we subsequently only consider contracts for road construction and
asphalting. We exclude contracts for civil engineering and mixed contracts, combining civil engi-
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neering and road construction or asphalting. The motivation is that some specific characteristics of
contracts in civil engineering could possibly affect the screens and therefore the correct classification
rate. Dropping mixed contracts and contracts for civil engineering permits verifying whether this
importantly affects the correct classification rate among the remaining contracts for road construc-
tion and asphalting. Table 12 reports the difference in percentage points in the correct classification
rates when using all contracts vs. using contracts for road construction and asphalting only.
Table 12: Differences in percentage points in correct classification rates of original random forest
minus the correct classification rates of the random forest using only contracts for road construction
and asphalting
Sample Cart.F Perc.Cart.F Tenders M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
1 > 1 81%
All -6.2 -5.2 -6.7 -5.5 -3.6
Comp. -7.2 -4.6 -6.9 -5.7 -3.8
Coll. -5.2 -5.8 -6.2 -5.2 -3.3
2 > 2 82%
All -2.8 -3 -4.3 -3.6 -1.2
Comp. -3.6 -3.1 -4.7 -3.9 -1.4
Coll. -1.9 -2.9 -3.8 -3.2 -1
3 > 3 84%
All 0.1 -0.6 -0.9 -0.6 0.2
Comp. -1.9 -1.5 -2.7 -2.1 -1.9
Coll. 2 0 0.5 0.5 1.9
4 > 4 86%
All 1.5 2.2 2 2.4 3.4
Comp. 2.2 2.7 1.9 2.5 3.1
Coll. 1 1.9 1.9 2.2 3.6
5 > 5 88%
All 2.6 3.3 2 2.1 2.7
Comp. 3.1 3.3 2.2 1.8 3
Coll. 1.9 3.2 1.9 2.4 2.3
Compl.
Cartel
All 100%
All 0.7 0.3 0 0.3 0.3
Comp. 0.9 -0.3 -0.4 0 -0.2
Coll. 0.4 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.8
Note: ”Sample”, ”Cartel.F”, ”Per.Cart.F”, ”Tenders”, ”M1”, ”M2”, ”M3”, ”M4” and ”M5” denote the sample, the number
of cartel firms in the collusive tenders, the percentage of cartel firms in the collusive tenders, the type of tenders, model 1,
model 2, model 3, model 4 and model 5, respectively. For the outcome classification, ”All”, ”Comp.” and ”Coll.” denote the
prediction for all types of tenders, the prediction for the competitive tenders and the prediction for the collusive tenders,
respectively.
In samples 1 and 2, we find the correct classification rates of the random forest for road construc-
tion and asphalting contracts to be superior to the classification rate of the random forest with all
types of contracts. For example, the difference of the (overall) classification rate of model 1 in sam-
ples 1 and 2 accounts for 6.2 and 2.8 percentage points, respectively. A possible explanation could
be that when we keep only the road construction and asphalting contracts, we implicitly suppress
some competitors. For example in sample 1, the relative amount of collusive bidders of 80.9% is
considerable higher as in the situation with all type of contracts (71.1%, see Table 9). The cartel
percent is therefore higher for this restricted sample of exclusively road construction and asphalting
contracts and explains the higher performance in samples 1 and 2. In sample 3, the situation begins
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to change for both types and the correct classification rates are quasi identical. Noticeably for all
models in samples 3 and 4, the differences rise again (not as strong as before), but in the opposite
direction. That means for an almost identical relative amount of cartel participants, the correct clas-
sification rates of the random forest for all types of contracts are slightly superior to the ones for road
construction and asphalting.
To investigate the robustness of the correct classification rate across different classes of machine
learning, we also assess the performance of lasso regression and an ensemble method (including
bagged trees, random forests and neural networks) as applied and outlined in Huber and Imhof
(2019) for all models and samples, which are explained in more detail in the appendix. Table 13
reports the difference in the correct classification rates of the random forest minus the correct classi-
fication rates of the lasso and the ensemble method.
Table 13: Differences in percentage points in correct classification rates of original random forest
minus the correct classification rates of the lasso and the ensemble method
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 Sample 5 Compl. Cart.
Tenders lasso ens. lasso ens. lasso ens. lasso ens. lasso ens. lasso ens.
M1
All -1.5 -2 -1.6 -2.3 -3.7 -2.7 -5.6 -6.7 -6 -4.3 0.9 0.4
Comp. -3.5 -1.4 -3.1 -0.7 -4.3 0.4 -5.9 0.9 -4 2.2 4.7 0.6
Coll. 0.1 -2.9 -0.4 -3.9 -3.1 -5.9 -5.4 -14.1 -8.3 -11 -3 0.1
M2
All -1.3 -1.1 -0.8 -0.7 -1.8 -1.3 -1.6 -1.8 -0.8 0.4 0.2 -0.8
Comp. -13 -9.9 4.8 1.5 2.2 1.4 2.7 1.3 2 2.4 4 -0.8
Coll. 10.3 7.5 -6.5 -2.9 -5.9 -4 -5.7 -4.7 -3.7 -2 -3.6 -0.9
M3
All -1.4 -0.9 -1.5 -1.2 -1.5 -1 -0.9 0.2 -0.3 0.6 0.1 0.1
Comp. 0.9 -0.8 0.5 -0.6 1.9 0.7 0.3 1.9 2.6 -6.1 4.6 1.2
Coll. -3.8 -1.1 -3.5 -1.8 -4.9 -2.6 -2.2 -1.7 -3.4 7.5 -4.4 -1
M4
All -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -1.4 -0.8 -0.9 -0.5 -0.3 1 0.2 -0.1
Comp. 2.7 0.3 2.9 0.2 2.2 0.9 1.5 1.2 2.6 2.8 4.7 0.9
Coll. -4.3 -1.8 -4.4 -1.5 -5 -2.4 -3.2 -2 -3.4 -0.9 -4.3 -1.1
M5
All -1.5 -2.9 -1.3 -1.4 -2.5 -1.1 -1.6 -1.8 1 -2.4 0.6 -0.1
Comp. -3.4 -3.4 -2.4 -2.2 -2.2 -1.4 -3 -0.1 2.4 5.9 4.4 0.6
Coll. 0.3 -2.2 -0.1 -0.6 -2.7 -0.8 -0.3 -3.3 -3.5 -13.8 -3.2 -0.9
Note: ”Tenders”, ”lasso”, ”ens.”, ”M1”, ”M2”, ”M3”, ”M4” and ”M5” denote the type of tenders, the lasso, the ensemble
of method, model 1, model 2, model 3, model 4 and model 5, respectively. For the type of tenders, ”All”, ”Comp.” and
”Coll.” denote the prediction for all types of tenders, the prediction for the competitive tenders and the prediction for the
collusive tenders, respectively.
Considering samples 1 and 2 in Table 13, we find that the lasso and ensemble method slightly
outperform the random forest. The maximumdifference in (overall) correct classification rates across
models and samples amounts to 2.9 percentage points. While the slightly lower rates speak against
the random forest, it shows a more uniform performance and therefore less divergence across com-
petitive and collusive periods, which may be an important aspect for practitioners. For samples 3, 4
and 5 the lasso and ensemble method in general slightly outperform the random forest, too, in two
cases even more profoundly with a 4.3 to 6.7 percentage points higher correct classification rate for
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model 1 in samples 4 and 5. This implies that in samples 4 and 5 (with a high amount of collusive
bidders), considering screens for subgroups does not significantly improve the predictive power of
lasso and ensemble method, in contrast to the random forest. On the other hand and as for samples
1 and 2, the random forest shows a more uniform performance (i.e. correct classification rates are
not too different for competitive and collusive tenders). In complete cartels, we find a similar perfor-
mance of (overall) correct classification rates between the random forest and the ensemble method.
However, the random forest slightly dominates the lasso regression. Considering the deviation across
prediction of competitive and collusive periods, the random forest and the ensemble method show
a less divergent performance than the lasso. To conclude, the random forest shows in Table 13 a
somewhat lower correct classification rate than the lasso and the ensemble of method, but exhibits a
more homogeneous correct classification rate across competitive and collusive tenders.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we suggested a method for flagging bid rigging in tenders that is likely more pow-
erful for detecting incomplete cartels than previously suggested methods. Our approach combined
screens, i.e. statistics derived from the distribution of bids in a tender, with machine learning to
predict the probability of collusion. As a methodological innovation, we calculated the screens for
all possible subgroups of three or four bids within a tender and considered summary statistics as
the mean, median, maximum, and minimum for each screen as predictors in the machine learning
algorithm. By this approach, we tackled the issue that competitive bids in incomplete cartels distort
the statistical signals produced by bid rigging.
We first applied the methods to the Ticino bid-rigging cartel and found the method to attain a
correct out-of-sample classification rate of of 77% to 86% even in the presence of simulated compet-
itive bids. Our approach increasingly outperformed other methods based on conventional screens
using all bids in a tender as the number of competitive bids per tender increased. In this simula-
tion, there was by design no strategic reaction or interaction of competitive and collusive bidders. To
allow for such reactions, we also applied our method to rather unique data from the investigations
involving partial cartels in the regions See-Gaster and Graubu¨nden in Switzerland. The out of sam-
ple performance of machine learning using summary statistics of screens (calculated for all possible
subgroups of three and four bids) as predictors outperformed other screeningmethods. However, the
performance of all machine learning-based methods decreased in the number of competitive bids,
indicating that cartel participants partially adapt their bids in the presence of competitive bidders.
Compared to screens calculated with all bids in a tender, summary statistics of screens calculated
for subgroups increased the correct classification rate by 5 to 10 and 3 to 7.5 percentage points for
incomplete cartels in the Ticino simulation and the Swiss data from See-Gaster and Graubu¨nden, re-
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spectively. This implies a substantial decrease in error rate (which is one minus the correct classifica-
tion rate) of 42.6% and 22.2% for the Ticino simulation and the Swiss data, respectively. As screening
by competition agencies can trigger investigations with legal consequences for potential cartel can-
didates, such decreases in the error rate appears more than desirable. Our results demonstrate the
usefulness of combining machine learning with an improved set of statistical screens reducing dis-
tortions of competitive bids in partial cartels. The method appears promising for detecting collusion
in other industries or countries as an agenda for future research.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Ticino Cartel
Table 14: Numbers of bids in a tender for the cartel and post-cartel periods in Ticino
Number of bids in a tender 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10+
Cartel Period 32 24 23 28 15 12 7 8
Post-cartel Period 8 2 8 3 5 4 2 1
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Table 15: Descriptive statistics for the collusive tenders in Ticino (without simulated bids)
Predictors Mean Std Min LowerQ. Median UpperQ. Max N
NBRBIDS 6.54 2.16 4 5 6 8 13 149
MEANBIDS 1134.58 1048.71 23.16 379.12 836.59 1547.76 4967.50 149
STDBIDS 34.08 30.13 0.82 12.77 25.84 44.68 136.90 149
CV 3.25 1.18 1.52 2.45 2.97 3.83 10.2 149
KURTO 2.71 2.12 −3.08 1.26 2.84 3.8 8.14 149
SKEW −1.13 0.96 −2.76 −1.85 −1.34 −0.6 2.21 149
SPD 0.1 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.37 149
D 49.15 43.01 1.64 15.90 39.10 70.17 272.45 149
RD 4.09 3.37 0.31 1.77 3.14 5.13 23.02 149
RDNOR 2.93 1.35 0.53 1.95 2.72 3.6 6.95 149
RDALT 7.06 6.4 0.43 2.73 5.47 8.22 40.02 149
DIFFP 5.09 1.98 1.03 4.19 5.13 5.55 21.74 149
KS 34.27 9.93 9.77 26.5 34.26 41.17 66.05 149
MIN3CV 0.7 0.8 0 0.13 0.41 0.99 4.36 149
MAX3CV 5.03 1.87 1.99 3.71 4.72 5.87 16.64 149
MEAN3CV 2.89 1.12 1.24 2.11 2.63 3.39 8.61 149
MEDIAN3CV 2.87 1.29 0.4 1.93 2.94 3.49 6.58 149
MIN3SKEW −1.67 0.17 −1.73 −1.73 −1.73 −1.71 −0.29 149
MAX3SKEW 1.33 0.72 −1.38 1.31 1.7 1.73 1.73 149
MEAN3SKEW −0.44 0.48 −1.56 −0.76 −0.39 −0.12 0.94 149
MEDIAN3SKEW −0.68 0.69 −1.69 −1.27 −0.74 −0.27 1.26 149
MIN3D 7.67 18.44 0.00 0.21 1.17 5.89 106.92 149
MAX3D 74.23 60.37 1.73 25.78 60.09 101.12 319.13 149
MEAN3D 37.58 36.04 1.03 11.60 28.73 45.99 186.08 149
MEDIAN3D 36.60 41.83 1.10 7.51 21.92 51.49 272.45 149
MIN3RD 0.43 0.75 0 0.02 0.1 0.46 4.86 149
MAX3RD 3177.54 31051.89 1.72 22.81 73.49 181.85 376725.28 149
MEAN3RD 48.87 279.28 0.75 5.09 8.67 13.66 3060.42 149
MEDIAN3RD 4.47 14.02 0.49 1.71 2.6 4.39 171.76 149
MIN3RDNOR 0.32 0.38 0 0.03 0.14 0.49 1.55 149
MAX3RDNOR 1.89 0.15 1.1 1.88 1.96 1.98 2 149
MEAN3RDNOR 1.2 0.22 0.61 1.05 1.17 1.35 1.74 149
MEDIAN3RDNOR 1.27 0.28 0.5 1.09 1.27 1.49 1.85 149
MIN3RDALT 0.3 0.53 0 0.02 0.07 0.33 3.44 149
MAX3RDALT 2246.86 21957 1.22 16.13 51.97 128.59 266385 149
MEAN3RDALT 34.56 197.48 0.53 3.6 6.13 9.66 2164.04 149
MEDIAN3RDALT 3.16 9.92 0.34 1.21 1.84 3.1 121.45 149
MIN3DIFFP 0.51 0.76 0 0.05 0.16 0.63 4.03 149
MAX3DIFFP 8 3.34 1.87 6.08 7.18 9.49 34.62 149
MEAN3DIFFP 3.68 1.58 1.19 2.56 3.35 4.55 15.43 149
MEDIAN3DIFFP 3.42 2.12 0.35 1.35 3.23 5.03 10.15 149
See next page
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Predictors Mean Std Min LowerQ. Median UpperQ. Max N
MIN3SPD 0.01 0.02 0 0 0.01 0.02 0.09 149
MAX3SPD 0.1 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.37 149
MEAN3SPD 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.19 149
MEDIAN3SPD 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.14 149
MIN3KS 22.12 6.72 6.04 17.08 21.28 26.94 50.12 149
MAX3KS 851.31 3306.73 23.21 101.26 244.9 742.41 39320 149
MEAN3KS 88.19 88.53 17.01 40.86 64.31 100.72 863.76 149
MEDIAN3KS 49.42 38.86 15.83 29.28 34.73 52.31 247.55 149
MIN4CV 1.35 1.31 0.04 0.28 0.86 2.29 6.49 149
MAX4CV 4.21 1.6 1.69 3.07 3.92 4.94 13.92 149
MEAN4CV 3.06 1.16 1.35 2.27 2.81 3.55 9.2 149
MEDIAN4CV 3.29 1.46 0.54 2.55 2.99 4.06 12.88 149
MIN4SKEW −1.67 0.58 −2 −1.99 −1.95 −1.62 1.47 149
MAX4SKEW 0.82 1.29 −1.92 −0.29 1.47 1.95 2 149
MEAN4SKEW −0.65 0.66 −1.92 −1.12 −0.57 −0.2 1.47 149
MEDIAN4SKEW −0.82 0.76 −1.96 −1.48 −0.9 −0.35 1.47 149
MIN4D 18.48 35.07 0.00 0.28 1.54 15.88 171.35 149
MAX4D 61.85 49.83 1.70 23.35 52.45 89.22 307.84 149
MEAN4D 40.84 38.74 1.34 12.48 29.47 52.38 229.44 149
MEDIAN4D 43.70 43.33 0.98 9.98 31.25 58.21 272.45 149
MIN4RD 1.15 2.28 0 0.04 0.19 1.14 13.56 149
MAX4RD 46.81 160.33 0.4 5.27 16.33 42.7 1865.04 149
MEAN4RD 5.2 4.81 0.4 2.47 3.79 6.54 34.88 149
MEDIAN4RD 3.27 2.83 0.32 1.44 2.34 4.24 19.6 149
MIN4RDNOR 0.65 0.75 0 0.06 0.28 1.11 2.62 149
MAX4RDNOR 2.47 0.53 0.53 2.22 2.69 2.87 3 149
MEAN4RDNOR 1.59 0.41 0.53 1.29 1.55 1.84 2.62 149
MEDIAN4RDNOR 1.66 0.5 0.44 1.29 1.65 2.05 2.73 149
MIN4RDALT 1.2 2.33 0 0.04 0.2 1.18 13.86 149
MAX4RDALT 49.69 170.21 0.43 5.68 17.11 43.97 1966.14 149
MEAN4RDALT 5.48 5.21 0.43 2.57 4.02 6.8 40.06 149
MEDIAN4RDALT 3.41 2.88 0.34 1.51 2.53 4.31 20.01 149
MIN4DIFFP 1.28 1.87 0 0.06 0.25 1.59 6.99 149
MAX4DIFFP 6.84 3.12 1.03 5.6 6.26 7.84 34.1 149
MEAN4DIFFP 4.05 1.79 1.03 2.88 3.58 5.02 18.1 149
MEDIAN4DIFFP 4.4 2.46 0.35 3.02 4.6 5.42 21.74 149
MIN4KURTO −2.38 3.14 −6 −5.32 −3.19 0.35 3.76 149
MAX4KURTO 3.17 1.37 −3.08 2.93 3.83 3.98 4 149
MEAN4KURTO 1.47 1.18 −3.08 0.86 1.55 2.31 3.76 149
MEDIAN4KURTO 1.93 1.27 −3.08 1.45 2.09 2.77 3.87 149
MIN4SPD 0.03 0.03 0 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.17 149
MAX4SPD 0.1 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.37 149
See next page
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Predictors Mean Std Min LowerQ. Median UpperQ. Max N
MEAN4SPD 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.24 149
MEDIAN4SPD 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.1 0.34 149
MIN4KS 26.58 8.13 7.22 20.48 25.64 32.53 59.33 149
MAX4KS 267.41 363.93 15.73 43.86 116.15 355.69 2643.96 149
MEAN4KS 55.64 36.47 15.73 31.62 43.12 64.75 195.25 149
MEDIAN4KS 38.72 25.53 7.82 24.73 33.39 39.56 184.51 149
Note: “Mean”, “Std”, “Min”, “Lower Q.”, “Median”, “Upper Q.”, “Max”, and “N” denote the mean, standard deviation,
minimum, lower quartile, median, upper quartile, maximum, and number of observations, respectively. The value for
”MEANBIDS”, ”STDBIDS”, ”D”, ”MIN3D”, ”MAX3D”, ”MEAN3D”, ”MEDIAN3D”, ”MIN4D”, ”MAX4D”, ”MEAN4D”
and ”MEDIAN4D” are expressed in thousand CHF. ”KS”, ”CV”, ”SPD”, ”RD”, ”RDNOR”, ”RDALT”, ”SKEW”, ”DIFFP”,
”KURTO”, ”D”, ”STDBIDS”, ”MEANBIDS” and ”NBRBIDS” denote the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Statistic, the coefficient of
variation, the spread, the relative distance, the normalized distance, the alternative relative distance, the skewness statistic,
the percentage difference, the kurtosis statistic, the difference in absolute between the first and second lowest bids, the
standard deviation of the bids in a tender, the mean of the bids in a tender and the number of the bids in a tender,
respectively.
39
Table 16: Descriptive statistics for the Ticino cartel in the post-cartel period
Predictors Mean Std Min LowerQ. Median UpperQ. Max N
NBRBIDS 6.73 2.34 4 5 6 8 13 33
MEANBIDS 756.79 785.43 43.97 279.90 482.05 695.68 3191.78 33
STDBIDS 54.83 49.50 2.79 27.78 39.64 61.86 209.64 33
CV 9.51 5.38 1.71 5.65 8.49 12.7 21.12 33
KURTO −0.08 1.78 −2.83 −1.31 −0.16 1.19 6.06 33
SKEW 0.24 0.85 −1.46 −0.31 0.31 0.93 2.36 33
SPD 0.31 0.2 0.04 0.16 0.26 0.47 0.84 33
D 29.67 36.08 0.68 7.87 17.42 31.26 149.28 33
RD 0.77 0.89 0.02 0.24 0.41 0.95 4.03 33
RDNOR 1.02 0.8 0.06 0.45 0.74 1.33 3.67 33
RDALT 1.22 1.23 0.05 0.42 0.72 1.46 4.84 33
DIFFP 5.16 5.02 0.23 2.21 3.73 5.07 20.6 33
KS 16.52 12.23 5.4 8.86 12.4 18.49 58.56 33
MIN3CV 2.58 2.8 0.07 1.03 1.73 3.11 12.23 33
MAX3CV 14.45 8.63 2.15 7.75 13.09 21.45 36.56 33
MEAN3CV 8.72 4.76 1.65 5.13 7.87 11.43 19.63 33
MEDIAN3CV 8.67 4.73 1.68 5.21 7.97 10.7 20.71 33
MIN3SKEW −1.48 0.55 −1.73 −1.72 −1.7 −1.53 0.7 33
MAX3SKEW 1.48 0.47 −0.27 1.6 1.69 1.73 1.73 33
MEAN3SKEW 0.1 0.51 −1.05 −0.2 0.21 0.42 1.2 33
MEDIAN3SKEW 0.14 0.79 −1.26 −0.5 0.29 0.74 1.2 33
MIN3D 14.25 32.20 0.16 1.29 2.58 8.54 149.28 33
MAX3D 107.42 100.76 2.88 48.31 76.20 133.87 471.50 33
MEAN3D 47.30 47.20 1.75 23.50 31.57 48.04 221.08 33
MEDIAN3D 41.00 38.93 1.44 19.67 28.88 39.00 183.76 33
MIN3RD 0.26 0.38 0.01 0.03 0.12 0.23 1.7 33
MAX3RD 39.4 59.34 0.86 6.69 17.33 39.98 274.21 33
MEAN3RD 4.37 4.62 0.51 1.85 3.4 4.4 25.42 33
MEDIAN3RD 1.65 1.17 0.53 0.83 1.16 2.09 4.24 33
MIN3RDNOR 0.25 0.28 0.01 0.04 0.16 0.28 1.09 33
MAX3RDNOR 1.74 0.29 0.76 1.65 1.85 1.93 1.99 33
MEAN3RDNOR 0.96 0.22 0.49 0.83 0.91 1.09 1.43 33
MEDIAN3RDNOR 0.96 0.29 0.53 0.74 0.9 1.17 1.49 33
MIN3RDALT 0.19 0.27 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.16 1.2 33
MAX3RDALT 27.86 41.96 0.61 4.73 12.25 28.27 193.89 33
MEAN3RDALT 3.09 3.27 0.36 1.31 2.4 3.11 17.97 33
MEDIAN3RDALT 1.17 0.83 0.37 0.59 0.82 1.48 3 33
MIN3DIFFP 1.53 2.45 0.05 0.34 0.58 1.75 13.25 33
MAX3DIFFP 21.91 14.6 2.6 10.75 17.43 30.98 62.88 33
MEAN3DIFFP 8.32 4.73 1.43 4.44 7.63 10.3 20.24 33
MEDIAN3DIFFP 7.1 4.23 1.3 3.98 6.12 8.64 20.6 33
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Predictors Mean Std Min LowerQ. Median UpperQ. Max N
MIN3SPD 0.05 0.06 0 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.28 33
MAX3SPD 0.31 0.2 0.04 0.16 0.26 0.47 0.84 33
MEAN3SPD 0.19 0.11 0.03 0.11 0.16 0.25 0.47 33
MEDIAN3SPD 0.19 0.11 0.03 0.11 0.17 0.23 0.49 33
MIN3KS 11.84 10.28 3.14 5.06 8.04 13.19 46.56 33
MAX3KS 113.2 230.7 8.41 32.52 58.13 97.09 1360.3 33
MEAN3KS 22.18 16.84 5.85 11.68 15.88 25.57 74.31 33
MEDIAN3KS 16.75 11.89 5.34 9.69 12.79 19.4 60.05 33
MIN4CV 4.4 4.32 0.5 1.85 2.93 6.33 20.66 33
MAX4CV 12.55 7.62 1.91 6.57 11.2 18.1 32.31 33
MEAN4CV 9.09 5 1.7 5.36 8.27 11.97 20.66 33
MEDIAN4CV 9.01 4.89 1.78 5.25 8.14 11.76 20.66 33
MIN4SKEW −1.16 0.91 −2 −1.81 −1.46 −0.79 1.32 33
MAX4SKEW 1.14 0.99 −1.46 0.81 1.57 1.89 2 33
MEAN4SKEW 0.11 0.7 −1.46 −0.35 0.22 0.58 1.32 33
MEDIAN4SKEW 0.19 0.73 −1.46 −0.24 0.22 0.77 1.34 33
MIN4D 20.50 38.09 0.16 1.62 3.62 15.10 149.28 33
MAX4D 76.56 77.30 1.26 36.48 62.49 92.32 435.92 33
MEAN4D 37.81 35.59 1.26 17.18 25.70 42.78 149.28 33
MEDIAN4D 34.53 35.39 1.26 15.94 23.39 35.73 149.28 33
MIN4RD 0.49 0.92 0.01 0.04 0.17 0.48 4.03 33
MAX4RD 10.2 22.25 0.17 1.9 4.15 8.5 128.38 33
MEAN4RD 1.55 1.44 0.17 0.83 1.03 1.71 7.36 33
MEDIAN4RD 1.03 0.94 0.1 0.48 0.67 1.32 4.03 33
MIN4RDNOR 0.43 0.52 0.02 0.06 0.23 0.59 2.01 33
MAX4RDNOR 1.95 0.68 0.23 1.48 2.07 2.46 2.95 33
MEAN4RDNOR 0.97 0.41 0.23 0.71 0.87 1.18 2.01 33
MEDIAN4RDNOR 0.91 0.49 0.15 0.59 0.77 1.26 2.01 33
MIN4RDALT 0.51 0.92 0.01 0.04 0.17 0.49 4.03 33
MAX4RDALT 10.47 22.63 0.17 1.94 4.48 9.13 130.64 33
MEAN4RDALT 1.62 1.48 0.17 0.87 1.06 1.75 7.68 33
MEDIAN4RDALT 1.07 0.96 0.11 0.49 0.68 1.45 4.03 33
MIN4DIFFP 2.43 4.4 0.16 0.4 0.84 2.75 20.6 33
MAX4DIFFP 16.11 11.32 0.54 7.23 15.77 20.11 45.9 33
MEAN4DIFFP 6.78 4.45 0.54 3.91 6.06 9.05 20.6 33
MEDIAN4DIFFP 5.97 4.5 0.54 3.28 5.07 7.1 20.6 33
MIN4KURTO −3.77 2.63 −6 −5.62 −4.78 −2.83 2.2 33
MAX4KURTO 2.65 1.73 −2.83 2.2 3.29 3.83 4 33
MEAN4KURTO −0.08 1.17 −2.83 −0.8 −0.08 0.48 2.2 33
MEDIAN4KURTO 0.17 1.52 −3.68 −0.53 0.69 1.18 2.2 33
MIN4SPD 0.11 0.13 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.13 0.63 33
MAX4SPD 0.31 0.2 0.04 0.16 0.26 0.47 0.84 33
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Predictors Mean Std Min LowerQ. Median UpperQ. Max N
MEAN4SPD 0.24 0.15 0.04 0.13 0.2 0.32 0.63 33
MEDIAN4SPD 0.23 0.14 0.04 0.13 0.2 0.31 0.63 33
MIN4KS 13.88 12.22 3.79 6.05 9.27 15.47 52.64 33
MAX4KS 43.49 37.89 5.4 16.37 34.46 54.38 201.12 33
MEAN4KS 17.88 12.29 5.4 9.86 13.17 22.37 60.1 33
MEDIAN4KS 16.68 12.04 5.4 9.1 12.71 19.31 56.12 33
Note: “Mean”, “Std”, “Min”, “Lower Q.”, “Median”, “Upper Q.”, “Max”, and “N” denote the mean, standard deviation,
minimum, lower quartile, median, upper quartile, maximum, and number of observations, respectively. The value for
”MEANBIDS”, ”STDBIDS”, ”D”, ”MIN3D”, ”MAX3D”, ”MEAN3D”, ”MEDIAN3D”, ”MIN4D”, ”MAX4D”, ”MEAN4D”
and ”MEDIAN4D” are expressed in thousand CHF. ”KS”, ”CV”, ”SPD”, ”RD”, ”RDNOR”, ”RDALT”, ”SKEW”, ”DIFFP”,
”KURTO”, ”D”, ”STDBIDS”, ”MEANBIDS” and ”NBRBIDS” denote the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic, the coefficient of
variation, the spread, the relative distance, the normalized distance, the alternative relative distance, the skewness statistic,
the percentage difference, the kurtosis statistic, the difference in absolute between the first and second lowest bids, the
standard deviation of the bids in a tender, the mean of the bids in a tender and the number of the bids in a tender,
respectively.
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Table 17: Descriptive statistics for collusive tenders of the Ticino cartel with five competitive bids
Predictors Mean Std Min LowerQ. Median UpperQ. Max N
NBRBIDS 10.79 2.49 6 9 11 12 18 184
MEANBIDS 1417.60 1328.38 19.00 383.19 897.16 1962.42 6080.35 184
STDBIDS 112.94 140.47 1.83 21.68 60.74 143.96 859.50 184
CV 7.38 3.23 2.77 5.16 6.89 8.95 23.83 184
KURTO 1.78 2.37 −1.91 −0.11 1.24 3.27 9.87 184
SKEW 0.11 1.24 −2.6 −0.87 −0.08 1.01 3.07 184
SPD 0.29 0.14 0.08 0.18 0.26 0.36 0.89 184
D 633.31 93.76 0.11 6.86 25.49 69.55 585.65 184
RD 0.93 1.04 0 0.23 0.64 1.13 5.77 184
RDNOR 1.84 1.55 0 0.66 1.52 2.57 8.19 184
RDALT 2.51 2.94 0 0.64 1.62 3.17 18.31 184
DIFFP 5.27 4.81 0.01 1.79 4.23 7.66 27.56 184
KS 16.68 5.95 5.44 12.41 15.44 19.79 37.34 184
MIN3CV 0.49 0.52 0 0.12 0.29 0.7 2.9 184
MAX3CV 13.83 6.03 4.57 9.3 12.54 17.06 37.62 184
MEAN3CV 6.2 2.41 2.4 4.54 5.9 7.49 19.05 184
MEDIAN3CV 5.6 2.23 1.48 4.04 5.08 6.52 13.65 184
MIN3SKEW −1.72 0.03 −1.73 −1.73 −1.73 −1.73 −1.51 184
MAX3SKEW 1.71 0.06 1.22 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73 184
MEAN3SKEW −0.06 0.4 −1.19 −0.33 −0.12 0.18 1.09 184
MEDIAN3SKEW −0.1 0.77 −1.56 −0.67 −0.25 0.44 1.73 184
MIN3D 4.61 10.12 0.00 0.16 0.66 2.96 70.32 184
MAX3D 239.79 245.60 4.90 62.47 146.83 354.79 1327.34 184
MEAN3D 82.36 91.89 1.86 20.25 45.74 109.63 391.88 184
MEDIAN3D 71.06 82.74 1.55 14.69 41.10 92.43 394.87 184
MIN3RD 0.05 0.08 0 0 0.01 0.05 0.52 184
MAX3RD 5367.51 51859.16 6.4 53.19 129.19 604.61 693080.61 184
MEAN3RD 43.17 245.44 0.95 4.22 7.71 16.32 2710.21 184
MEDIAN3RD 1.82 1.01 0.25 1.11 1.69 2.28 7.49 184
MIN3RDNOR 0.06 0.09 0 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.54 184
MAX3RDNOR 1.96 0.06 1.64 1.95 1.98 2 2 184
MEAN3RDNOR 1.04 0.17 0.6 0.94 1.06 1.16 1.56 184
MEDIAN3RDNOR 1.05 0.26 0.3 0.88 1.08 1.23 1.68 184
MIN3RDALT 0.03 0.06 0 0 0.01 0.03 0.37 184
MAX3RDALT 3795.41 36669.96 4.53 37.61 91.35 427.52 490082 184
MEAN3RDALT 30.53 173.55 0.67 2.98 5.45 11.54 1916.41 184
MEDIAN3RDALT 1.29 0.72 0.18 0.79 1.19 1.61 5.29 184
MIN3DIFFP 0.23 0.34 0 0.02 0.11 0.29 2.01 184
MAX3DIFFP 20.05 8.11 7.05 13.94 18.21 24.27 53.73 184
MEAN3DIFFP 6.33 2.43 2.48 4.4 5.8 7.74 13.45 184
MEDIAN3DIFFP 5.21 2.33 0.87 3.55 5 6.2 14.71 184
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Predictors Mean Std Min LowerQ. Median UpperQ. Max N
MIN3SPD 0.01 0.01 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.06 184
MAX3SPD 0.29 0.14 0.08 0.18 0.26 0.36 0.89 184
MEAN3SPD 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.45 184
MEDIAN3SPD 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.1 0.14 0.3 184
MIN3KS 8.83 3.51 3.06 6.22 8.1 11 22.3 184
MAX3KS 938.54 3130.28 34.68 144.12 339.85 830.93 39320 184
MEAN3KS 39.88 25.59 8.37 23.92 32.91 46.72 192.41 184
MEDIAN3KS 20.92 8.4 7.62 15.44 19.97 25.03 67.92 184
MIN4CV 0.94 0.95 0.04 0.28 0.73 1.27 7.67 184
MAX4CV 12.03 5.14 4.23 8.2 11.03 14.48 33.57 184
MEAN4CV 6.57 2.64 2.53 4.7 6.26 7.89 20.74 184
MEDIAN4CV 6.27 2.82 1.9 4.49 5.74 7.44 26 184
MIN4SKEW −1.92 0.19 −2 −2 −1.99 −1.93 −0.67 184
MAX4SKEW 1.87 0.29 0.22 1.89 1.99 2 2 184
MEAN4SKEW −0.08 0.53 −1.53 −0.48 −0.17 0.26 1.2 184
MEDIAN4SKEW −0.06 0.7 −1.54 −0.59 −0.14 0.33 1.74 184
MIN4D 5.32 11.79 0.00 0.16 0.68 3.10 70.32 184
MAX4D 196.40 202.67 3.82 56.66 112.66 278.55 903.60 184
MEAN4D 75.31 87.29 1.35 18.73 41.48 96.57 449.88 184
MEDIAN4D 70.54 87.18 0.82 14.65 37.46 87.74 449.27 184
MIN4RD 0.06 0.11 0 0 0.02 0.06 0.74 184
MAX4RD 117.38 392.24 1.49 14.96 33.85 95.96 4710.41 184
MEAN4RD 3.59 4.07 0.37 1.59 2.58 4.27 44.88 184
MEDIAN4RD 1.31 0.78 0.12 0.72 1.21 1.76 4.63 184
MIN4RDNOR 0.09 0.14 0 0.01 0.03 0.1 0.81 184
MAX4RDNOR 2.74 0.29 1.32 2.65 2.84 2.94 3 184
MEAN4RDNOR 1.18 0.31 0.4 0.98 1.23 1.4 2.21 184
MEDIAN4RDNOR 1.13 0.41 0.17 0.83 1.18 1.43 2.12 184
MIN4RDALT 0.07 0.12 0 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.74 184
MAX4RDALT 124.1 415.85 1.56 15.04 34.79 99.1 4965.75 184
MEAN4RDALT 3.73 4.24 0.39 1.69 2.66 4.48 47.93 184
MEDIAN4RDALT 1.37 0.81 0.12 0.77 1.28 1.81 4.82 184
MIN4DIFFP 0.27 0.41 0 0.03 0.11 0.3 2.5 184
MAX4DIFFP 16.67 6.63 6 11.57 15.6 20.15 40.38 184
MEAN4DIFFP 5.99 2.63 1.71 3.99 5.49 7.6 14.87 184
MEDIAN4DIFFP 5.32 2.7 0.58 3.57 4.86 6.48 19.21 184
MIN4KURTO −5.57 0.76 −6 −5.96 −5.84 −5.55 −0.04 184
MAX4KURTO 3.9 0.2 2.88 3.91 3.98 4 4 184
MEAN4KURTO 0.64 0.77 −1.74 0.15 0.72 1.11 2.39 184
MEDIAN4KURTO 1.32 0.98 −2.78 0.88 1.51 1.86 3.24 184
MIN4SPD 0.02 0.02 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.18 184
MAX4SPD 0.29 0.14 0.08 0.18 0.26 0.36 0.89 184
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Predictors Mean Std Min LowerQ. Median UpperQ. Max N
MEAN4SPD 0.16 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.19 0.57 184
MEDIAN4SPD 0.15 0.08 0.05 0.11 0.13 0.18 0.75 184
MIN4KS 10.09 3.78 3.67 7.33 9.25 12.34 23.85 184
MAX4KS 288.31 349.99 13.07 79.29 137.96 363.99 2643.96 184
MEAN4KS 26.2 11.64 6.8 17.79 23.37 32.35 72.53 184
MEDIAN4KS 19.03 7.35 4.49 13.87 17.82 22.57 53.22 184
Note: “Mean”, “Std”, “Min”, “Lower Q.”, “Median”, “Upper Q.”, “Max”, and “N” denote the mean, standard deviation,
minimum, lower quartile, median, upper quartile, maximum, and number of observations, respectively. The value for
”MEANBIDS”, ”STDBIDS”, ”D”, ”MIN3D”, ”MAX3D”, ”MEAN3D”, ”MEDIAN3D”, ”MIN4D”, ”MAX4D”, ”MEAN4D”
and ”MEDIAN4D” are expressed in thousand CHF. ”KS”, ”CV”, ”SPD”, ”RD”, ”RDNOR”, ”RDALT”, ”SKEW”, ”DIFFP”,
”KURTO”, ”D”, ”STDBIDS”, ”MEANBIDS” and ”NBRBIDS” denote the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic, the coefficient of
variation, the spread, the relative distance, the normalized distance, the alternative relative distance, the skewness statistic,
the percentage difference, the kurtosis statistic, the difference in absolute between the first and second lowest bids, the
standard deviation of the bids in a tender, the mean of the bids in a tender and the number of the bids in a tender,
respectively.
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Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics for the Swiss Data
Table 18: Numbers of bids in a tender in the Swiss data
Number of bids in a tender 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10+
Tenders with complete cartels 94 50 29 24 33 33 23 24
Tenders with incomplete cartels 56 36 38 40 27 28 24 38
Competitive tenders 786 559 365 257 158 129 74 70
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Table 19: Descriptive statistics for the collusive tenders including only cartel participants in the
Swiss data
Predictors Mean Std Min LowerQ. Median UpperQ. Max N
NBRBIDS 6.57 2.44 4 4 6 9 13 308
MEANBIDS 379.88 376.09 34.42 172.13 305.81 460.98 3509.71 308
STDBIDS 13.15 13.67 0.49 5.59 9.75 15.88 109.94 308
CV 3.66 2.09 0.6 2.22 3.29 4.51 15.73 308
KURTO 0.16 1.65 −5.4 −0.99 0.21 1.33 4.37 308
SKEW 0.08 0.81 −1.94 −0.42 0.07 0.7 1.78 308
SPD 0.11 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.5 308
D 9.20 13.32 0.14 2.93 6.02 10.11 121.30 308
RD 1.16 1.36 0.01 0.46 0.75 1.31 13.66 308
RDNOR 1.38 0.79 0.02 0.78 1.24 1.72 5.03 308
RDALT 1.83 1.73 0.01 0.74 1.33 2.2 13.89 308
DIFFP 2.76 2.91 0.06 1.3 1.94 3.24 34.11 308
KS 36.54 20.15 6.59 22.69 31.2 45.55 167.93 308
MIN3CV 1.08 1.01 0.04 0.48 0.81 1.26 8.46 308
MAX3CV 5.49 3.41 0.73 3.14 4.72 6.88 21.17 308
MEAN3CV 3.41 1.94 0.57 2.1 3.04 4.18 15.32 308
MEDIAN3CV 3.46 2 0.63 2.1 3 4.25 16.87 308
MIN3SKEW −1.48 0.44 −1.73 −1.73 −1.7 −1.42 0.69 308
MAX3SKEW 1.41 0.63 −1.49 1.43 1.68 1.73 1.73 308
MEAN3SKEW 0 0.49 −1.61 −0.26 0.05 0.33 1.16 308
MEDIAN3SKEW 0.03 0.69 −1.7 −0.41 0.07 0.55 1.53 308
MIN3D 2.67 6.13 0.00 0.38 1.03 2.99 73.33 308
MAX3D 26.81 27.14 0.59 10.58 20.08 32.20 200.26 308
MEAN3D 11.62 13.40 0.43 4.63 8.44 13.24 118.06 308
MEDIAN3D 10.88 13.28 0.42 3.89 7.87 12.01 121.30 308
MIN3RD 0.38 0.73 0 0.04 0.14 0.38 6.13 308
MAX3RD 117.7 665.15 0.87 5.26 16.67 54.56 9157.71 308
MEAN3RD 7.53 23.86 0.55 1.92 3.04 5.7 291.4 308
MEDIAN3RD 1.95 2.79 0.29 0.97 1.37 1.98 39.01 308
MIN3RDNOR 0.3 0.33 0 0.06 0.17 0.42 1.63 308
MAX3RDNOR 1.73 0.28 0.76 1.58 1.85 1.95 2 308
MEAN3RDNOR 1 0.22 0.51 0.86 0.98 1.11 1.8 308
MEDIAN3RDNOR 0.99 0.26 0.33 0.81 0.98 1.14 1.85 308
MIN3RDALT 0.27 0.52 0 0.03 0.1 0.27 4.34 308
MAX3RDALT 83.23 470.33 0.62 3.72 11.79 38.58 6475.48 308
MEAN3RDALT 5.32 16.87 0.39 1.36 2.15 4.03 206.05 308
MEDIAN3RDALT 1.38 1.97 0.2 0.68 0.97 1.4 27.58 308
MIN3DIFFP 0.69 0.85 0 0.15 0.44 0.91 8.62 308
MAX3DIFFP 8.1 6.07 1.13 4.26 6.76 10.05 47.45 308
MEAN3DIFFP 3.37 2.32 0.77 1.99 2.77 4.08 22.76 308
MEDIAN3DIFFP 3.13 2.31 0.69 1.79 2.51 3.95 23.91 308
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Predictors Mean Std Min LowerQ. Median UpperQ. Max N
MIN3SPD 0.02 0.02 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.18 308
MAX3SPD 0.11 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.5 308
MEAN3SPD 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.37 308
MEDIAN3SPD 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.41 308
MIN3KS 26.02 17.06 4.76 14.83 21.48 31.93 137.18 308
MAX3KS 181.77 213.13 12.09 79.31 124.09 206.54 2751.23 308
MEAN3KS 48.26 25.64 7.44 30.53 42.03 60.32 199.62 308
MEDIAN3KS 38.19 20.28 6.19 24.04 33.58 47.94 158.95 308
MIN4CV 1.93 1.66 0.22 0.91 1.5 2.37 15.73 308
MAX4CV 4.74 2.95 0.6 2.75 4.07 5.83 19.16 308
MEAN4CV 3.54 2.01 0.6 2.18 3.13 4.35 15.73 308
MEDIAN4CV 3.6 2.07 0.6 2.22 3.21 4.39 15.73 308
MIN4SKEW −1.07 0.98 −2 −1.89 −1.5 −0.41 1.78 308
MAX4SKEW 1.07 1.02 −1.93 0.46 1.48 1.87 2 308
MEAN4SKEW 0.04 0.68 −1.93 −0.35 0.07 0.5 1.78 308
MEDIAN4SKEW 0.05 0.71 −1.93 −0.3 0.03 0.54 1.78 308
MIN4D 4.47 11.64 0.00 0.50 1.36 3.86 121.30 308
MAX4D 20.38 20.98 0.36 7.07 14.66 25.33 121.30 308
MEAN4D 10.11 12.76 0.36 3.81 6.99 11.59 121.30 308
MEDIAN4D 9.73 13.27 0.17 3.48 6.40 10.73 121.30 308
MIN4RD 0.68 1.38 0 0.06 0.23 0.67 13.66 308
MAX4RD 9.14 19.83 0.15 1.51 4.31 10.73 298.7 308
MEAN4RD 1.66 1.53 0.15 0.87 1.26 1.94 13.66 308
MEDIAN4RD 1.26 1.37 0.07 0.61 0.87 1.35 13.66 308
MIN4RDNOR 0.53 0.58 0 0.1 0.31 0.77 2.62 308
MAX4RDNOR 1.9 0.72 0.22 1.31 2.09 2.55 2.98 308
MEAN4RDNOR 1.07 0.4 0.22 0.8 1.02 1.27 2.62 308
MEDIAN4RDNOR 1.02 0.44 0.1 0.72 0.93 1.23 2.62 308
MIN4RDALT 0.71 1.44 0 0.07 0.23 0.69 13.89 308
MAX4RDALT 9.67 22.08 0.15 1.55 4.57 11.2 340.47 308
MEAN4RDALT 1.74 1.62 0.15 0.91 1.33 2.02 13.89 308
MEDIAN4RDALT 1.31 1.42 0.07 0.64 0.9 1.38 13.89 308
MIN4DIFFP 1.19 1.93 0 0.19 0.67 1.55 23.91 308
MAX4DIFFP 6.2 5.28 0.64 2.59 4.98 7.89 39.3 308
MEAN4DIFFP 2.95 2.42 0.61 1.66 2.29 3.56 24.48 308
MEDIAN4DIFFP 2.82 2.74 0.2 1.49 2.08 3.28 34.11 308
MIN4KURTO −2.96 2.98 −6 −5.63 −4.23 −0.28 3.75 308
MAX4KURTO 2.44 1.83 −5.4 1.66 3.14 3.77 4 308
MEAN4KURTO 0.14 1.36 −5.4 −0.58 0.09 0.95 3.75 308
MEDIAN4KURTO 0.34 1.54 −5.4 −0.28 0.61 1.31 3.75 308
MIN4SPD 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.47 308
MAX4SPD 0.11 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.5 308
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Predictors Mean Std Min LowerQ. Median UpperQ. Max N
MEAN4SPD 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.1 0.47 308
MEDIAN4SPD 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.1 0.47 308
MIN4KS 30.68 20.89 5.42 17.65 24.8 36.76 167.93 308
MAX4KS 88.22 69.07 6.59 42.47 67.21 110.66 458.02 308
MEAN4KS 39.97 20.41 6.59 26.34 35.08 50.1 167.93 308
MEDIAN4KS 36.66 19.93 6.59 23.01 31.38 45.53 167.93 308
Note: “Mean”, “Std”, “Min”, “Lower Q.”, “Median”, “Upper Q.”, “Max”, and “N” denote the mean, standard deviation,
minimum, lower quartile, median, upper quartile, maximum, and number of observations, respectively. The value for
”MEANBIDS”, ”STDBIDS”, ”D”, ”MIN3D”, ”MAX3D”, ”MEAN3D”, ”MEDIAN3D”, ”MIN4D”, ”MAX4D”, ”MEAN4D”
and ”MEDIAN4D” are expressed in thousand CHF. ”KS”, ”CV”, ”SPD”, ”RD”, ”RDNOR”, ”RDALT”, ”SKEW”, ”DIFFP”,
”KURTO”, ”D”, ”STDBIDS”, ”MEANBIDS” and ”NBRBIDS” denote the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic, the coefficient of
variation, the spread, the relative distance, the normalized distance, the alternative relative distance, the skewness statistic,
the percentage difference, the kurtosis statistic, the difference in absolute between the first and second lowest bids, the
standard deviation of the bids in a tender, the mean of the bids in a tender and the number of the bids in a tender,
respectively.
49
Table 20: Descriptive statistics for the competitive tenders in the Swiss data
Predictors Mean Std Min LowerQ. Median UpperQ. Max N
NBRBIDS 5.73 1.86 4 4 5 7 13 1082
MEANBIDS 828.06 1803.84 13.63 203.87 423.97 858.67 37786.87 1082
STDBIDS 87.35 216.52 0.41 13.96 32.74 81.27 3996.24 1082
CV 10.12 7.89 0.76 5.91 8.45 11.64 128 1082
KURTO 0.25 2.27 −6 −1.27 0.13 1.75 8.03 1082
SKEW 0.26 0.97 −2.68 −0.37 0.28 0.92 2.47 1082
SPD 2.5 29.79 0.02 0.16 0.24 0.35 730.71 1082
D 54.94 223.18 0.00 5.18 14.19 39.12 4656.85 1082
RD 1.16 2.45 0 0.23 0.57 1.13 41.26 1082
RDNOR 1.04 0.82 0 0.43 0.87 1.44 6.95 1082
RDALT 1.61 3.19 0 0.36 0.84 1.66 47.49 1082
DIFFP 176.79 2246.36 0 1.84 4.36 8.43 50228.95 1082
KS 15.07 10.98 1.48 9.12 12.24 17.44 132.33 1082
MIN3CV 3.37 3.13 0.02 1.16 2.33 4.68 24.05 1082
MAX3CV 14.22 11.46 0.93 8.19 11.77 16.52 122.06 1082
MEAN3CV 9.37 6.9 0.73 5.56 7.92 10.9 91.8 1082
MEDIAN3CV 9.7 7.83 0.6 5.61 8.19 11.41 121.69 1082
MIN3SKEW −1.38 0.62 −1.73 −1.73 −1.67 −1.34 1.68 1082
MAX3SKEW 1.47 0.53 −1.61 1.48 1.69 1.73 1.73 1082
MEAN3SKEW 0.13 0.58 −1.66 −0.22 0.16 0.51 1.71 1082
MEDIAN3SKEW 0.22 0.83 −1.73 −0.35 0.26 0.83 1.73 1082
MIN3D 13.03 30.15 0.00 1.10 3.79 11.64 364.58 1082
MAX3D 154.93 433.88 0.72 22.68 52.94 132.40 7506.55 1082
MEAN3D 69.05 178.70 0.44 11.05 25.66 60.66 2536.05 1082
MEDIAN3D 64.40 171.21 0.36 10.29 23.09 56.37 2640.97 1082
MIN3RD 0.32 0.68 0 0.03 0.12 0.34 8.83 1082
MAX3RD 69.28 265.38 0.13 4.44 12.27 38.7 5315.77 1082
MEAN3RD 8.2 25.53 0.08 1.55 2.78 6.05 421.57 1082
MEDIAN3RD 2.22 4.95 0.01 0.78 1.21 1.98 72.77 1082
MIN3RDNOR 0.27 0.3 0 0.05 0.16 0.39 1.72 1082
MAX3RDNOR 1.68 0.34 0.17 1.52 1.8 1.93 2 1082
MEAN3RDNOR 0.94 0.27 0.11 0.77 0.93 1.11 1.85 1082
MEDIAN3RDNOR 0.92 0.34 0.01 0.7 0.91 1.12 1.94 1082
MIN3RDALT 0.22 0.48 0 0.02 0.09 0.24 6.24 1082
MAX3RDALT 48.99 187.65 0.1 3.14 8.67 27.36 3758.82 1082
MEAN3RDALT 5.8 18.05 0.06 1.1 1.96 4.27 298.09 1082
MEDIAN3RDALT 1.57 3.5 0 0.55 0.85 1.4 51.46 1082
MIN3DIFFP 2.07 2.77 0 0.36 0.98 2.56 22.67 1082
MAX3DIFFP 226.26 2740.18 0.89 9.94 15.42 23.4 63802.49 1082
MEAN3DIFFP 92.86 1118.61 0.64 4.6 7.07 10.73 23734.93 1082
MEDIAN3DIFFP 60.05 1011.71 0.54 4.08 6.52 10.25 25112.51 1082
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Predictors Mean Std Min LowerQ. Median UpperQ. Max N
MIN3SPD 0.07 0.07 0 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.58 1082
MAX3SPD 2.5 29.79 0.02 0.16 0.24 0.35 730.71 1082
MEAN3SPD 1.14 12.52 0.01 0.11 0.16 0.23 279.23 1082
MEDIAN3SPD 0.76 10.69 0.01 0.11 0.17 0.25 264.32 1082
MIN3KS 10.96 8.72 1.1 6.33 8.72 12.45 107.96 1082
MAX3KS 82.65 179.47 4.21 21.54 43 86.79 4045.44 1082
MEAN3KS 21.45 21.35 2.62 11.62 16.51 24.77 463.06 1082
MEDIAN3KS 15.78 13.43 1.2 9.07 12.57 18.27 167.49 1082
MIN4CV 6.24 6.77 0.07 2.29 4.49 8.14 128 1082
MAX4CV 12.14 9.73 0.76 7.07 10.13 14.17 128 1082
MEAN4CVB 9.82 7.64 0.76 5.74 8.29 11.45 128 1082
MEDIAN4CV 10.24 8.21 0.76 6 8.55 11.74 128 1082
MIN4SKEW −0.75 1.09 −2 −1.72 −1.02 0 2 1082
MAX4SKEW 1.02 1 −1.99 0.34 1.4 1.85 2 1082
MEAN4SKEW 0.19 0.8 −1.99 −0.31 0.22 0.74 2 1082
MEDIAN4SKEW 0.22 0.86 −1.99 −0.27 0.19 0.79 2 1082
MIN4D 22.95 76.73 0.00 1.76 5.64 18.51 1226.06 1082
MAX4D 111.58 328.01 0.02 13.13 34.32 86.30 5764.43 1082
MEAN4D 59.42 181.05 0.02 8.14 19.23 46.70 3035.79 1082
MEDIAN4D 59.94 224.26 0.00 6.98 18.35 45.41 4656.85 1082
MIN4RD 0.71 2.05 0 0.06 0.2 0.62 41.26 1082
MAX4RD 6.73 17.51 0 0.88 2.55 6.3 266.72 1082
MEAN4RD 1.69 3.23 0 0.56 1 1.72 67.61 1082
MEDIAN4RD 1.24 2.28 0 0.39 0.74 1.25 41.26 1082
MIN4RDNOR 0.51 0.56 0 0.09 0.29 0.76 2.87 1082
MAX4RDNOR 1.62 0.81 0 0.96 1.74 2.3 2.98 1082
MEAN4RDNOR 0.95 0.51 0 0.61 0.9 1.21 2.87 1082
MEDIAN4RDNOR 0.9 0.55 0 0.51 0.84 1.19 2.87 1082
MIN4RDALT 0.75 2.18 0 0.06 0.21 0.67 43.5 1082
MAX4RDALT 7.07 18.5 0 0.93 2.69 6.57 267.55 1082
MEAN4RDALT 1.77 3.36 0 0.59 1.05 1.8 68.45 1082
MEDIAN4RDALT 1.3 2.4 0 0.41 0.78 1.31 43.5 1082
MIN4DIFFP 20.35 549.37 0 0.51 1.54 4.44 18073.22 1082
MAX4DIFFP 206.69 2603.79 0.03 5.44 9.88 16.43 62175.31 1082
MEAN4DIFFP 116.56 1450.99 0.03 3.24 5.46 9.08 30433.18 1082
MEDIAN4DIFFP 140.96 2011.38 0 2.73 5.24 8.95 50228.95 1082
MIN4KURTO −2.61 3.02 −6 −5.39 −3.37 0.07 4 1082
MAX4KURTO 2.07 2.28 −6 1.43 2.94 3.72 4 1082
MEAN4KURTO 0.12 1.83 −6 −0.83 0.1 1.31 4 1082
MEDIAN4KURTO 0.29 2.06 −6 −0.75 0.6 1.62 4 1082
MIN4SPD 0.34 6.03 0 0.05 0.1 0.2 198.43 1082
MAX4SPD 2.5 29.79 0.02 0.16 0.24 0.35 730.71 1082
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Predictors Mean Std Min LowerQ. Median UpperQ. Max N
MEAN4SPD 1.54 17.19 0.02 0.14 0.2 0.29 388.02 1082
MEDIAN4SPD 1.78 23.58 0.02 0.14 0.21 0.3 621.75 1082
MIN4KS 12.89 10.47 1.38 7.42 10.24 14.5 132.33 1082
MAX4KS 36.64 66.05 1.48 12.61 22.53 44.04 1433.11 1082
MEAN4KS 16.65 11.9 1.48 9.73 13.55 19.78 132.33 1082
MEDIAN4KS 14.87 11.3 1.48 8.9 12.14 16.99 132.33 1082
Note: “Mean”, “Std”, “Min”, “Lower Q.”, “Median”, “Upper Q.”, “Max”, and “N” denote the mean, standard deviation,
minimum, lower quartile, median, upper quartile, maximum, and number of observations, respectively. The value for
”MEANBIDS”, ”STDBIDS”, ”D”, ”MIN3D”, ”MAX3D”, ”MEAN3D”, ”MEDIAN3D”, ”MIN4D”, ”MAX4D”, ”MEAN4D”
and ”MEDIAN4D” are expressed in thousand CHF. ”KS”, ”CV”, ”SPD”, ”RD”, ”RDNOR”, ”RDALT”, ”SKEW”, ”DIFFP”,
”KURTO”, ”D”, ”STDBIDS”, ”MEANBIDS” and ”NBRBIDS” denote the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic, the coefficient of
variation, the spread, the relative distance, the normalized distance, the alternative relative distance, the skewness statistic,
the percentage difference, the kurtosis statistic, the difference in absolute between the first and second lowest bids, the
standard deviation of the bids in a tender, the mean of the bids in a tender and the number of the bids in a tender,
respectively.
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Table 21: Descriptive statistics for incomplete bid-rigging cartels in sample 1
Predictors Mean Std Min LowerQ. Median UpperQ. Max N
NBRBIDS 7.49 2.54 4 5 7 9 13 252
MEANBIDS 435.90 476.67 18.01 146.59 296.62 538.73 3460.91 252
STDBIDS 35.12 50.17 1.54 9.60 19.62 33.72 362.86 252
CV 7.79 3.89 1.77 5.14 6.79 9.6 23.92 252
KURTO 0.41 2.12 −5.9 −0.94 0.04 1.54 6.97 252
SKEW −0.07 0.99 −2.59 −0.67 −0.06 0.5 2.57 252
SPD 0.26 0.16 0.05 0.16 0.21 0.32 0.89 252
D 21.07 39.03 0.08 4.33 9.10 20.87 351.83 252
RD 1.39 2.67 0.01 0.26 0.58 1.42 28.37 252
RDNOR 1.41 1.11 0.01 0.59 1.14 2 5.48 252
RDALT 2.32 3.52 0.01 0.55 1.17 2.65 28.54 252
DIFFP 6.34 8.85 0.03 1.8 3.69 7.02 73.53 252
KS 16.62 8.04 4.15 10.99 15.24 19.97 57.54 252
MIN3CV 1.68 1.73 0 0.65 1.24 2.14 14.77 252
MAX3CV 12.26 6.39 2.9 7.87 10.66 15.21 38.48 252
MEAN3CV 7.12 3.48 1.55 4.7 6.32 8.98 22.96 252
MEDIAN3CV 7.06 3.81 1.01 4.59 6.28 8.51 29.82 252
MIN3SKEW −1.6 0.36 −1.73 −1.73 −1.72 −1.65 0.97 252
MAX3SKEW 1.53 0.48 −1.1 1.64 1.72 1.73 1.73 252
MEAN3SKEW −0.04 0.5 −1.43 −0.3 −0.03 0.25 1.47 252
MEDIAN3SKEW −0.05 0.77 −1.71 −0.59 −0.05 0.51 1.73 252
MIN3D 3.64 8.58 0.00 0.43 1.31 3.23 80.15 252
MAX3D 76.68 107.56 1.58 18.87 41.15 80.60 842.70 252
MEAN3D 29.56 44.27 0.62 8.00 16.57 28.64 437.36 252
MEDIAN3D 26.54 40.57 0.41 7.70 14.60 27.21 424.30 252
MIN3RD 0.23 0.45 0 0.02 0.07 0.19 3.35 252
MAX3RD 1203.97 9993.9 0.68 10.98 31.05 96.88 122393.82 252
MEAN3RD 27.54 191.86 0.31 2.5 4.5 9.16 2742.11 252
MEDIAN3RD 2.09 2.42 0.21 1.02 1.49 2.21 27.08 252
MIN3RDNOR 0.21 0.28 0 0.03 0.09 0.24 1.41 252
MAX3RDNOR 1.83 0.23 0.65 1.77 1.92 1.97 2 252
MEAN3RDNOR 1.02 0.22 0.33 0.89 1.02 1.12 1.73 252
MEDIAN3RDNOR 1.02 0.3 0.26 0.83 1.02 1.2 1.89 252
MIN3RDALT 0.16 0.32 0 0.02 0.05 0.14 2.37 252
MAX3RDALT 851.33 7066.76 0.48 7.76 21.95 68.51 86545.5 252
MEAN3RDALT 19.47 135.66 0.22 1.77 3.18 6.48 1938.96 252
MEDIAN3RDALT 1.48 1.71 0.15 0.72 1.06 1.56 19.15 252
MIN3DIFFP 0.97 1.58 0 0.17 0.47 1.15 12.6 252
MAX3DIFFP 19.61 12.81 2.29 11.28 16.77 25.1 87.65 252
MEAN3DIFFP 7.76 5.62 1.39 4.79 6.4 8.94 49.6 252
MEDIAN3DIFFP 7.11 6.59 1.14 3.9 5.72 8.21 73.53 252
See next page
53
Predictors Mean Std Min LowerQ. Median UpperQ. Max N
MIN3SPD 0.03 0.04 0 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.32 252
MAX3SPD 0.26 0.16 0.05 0.16 0.21 0.32 0.89 252
MEAN3SPD 0.15 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.13 0.19 0.62 252
MEDIAN3SPD 0.15 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.13 0.18 0.83 252
MIN3KS 10.96 6.18 3 6.88 9.62 12.9 34.52 252
MAX3KS 357.52 3429.85 6.79 47.14 80.58 155 54476.99 252
MEAN3KS 27.25 34.52 6.03 15.6 21.55 29.85 495.16 252
MEDIAN3KS 18.68 11.16 3.36 12.03 16.1 22.21 99.02 252
MIN4CV 3.16 2.97 0.12 1.31 2.26 4.2 23.92 252
MAX4CV 10.63 5.46 2.38 6.97 9.43 13.25 33.94 252
MEAN4CV 7.43 3.65 1.64 4.89 6.54 9.33 23.92 252
MEDIAN4CV 7.65 3.91 1.69 5.02 6.76 9.66 25.38 252
MIN4SKEW −1.42 0.79 −2 −1.95 −1.78 −1.22 1.87 252
MAX4SKEW 1.28 0.97 −1.98 1.09 1.79 1.94 2 252
MEAN4SKEW −0.07 0.69 −1.98 −0.43 −0.05 0.38 1.87 252
MEDIAN4SKEW −0.07 0.79 −1.98 −0.47 −0.03 0.32 1.87 252
MIN4D 4.98 11.53 0.00 0.48 1.63 4.68 102.18 252
MAX4D 60.49 87.82 0.18 13.66 33.62 66.93 771.65 252
MEAN4D 25.08 38.97 0.18 6.81 14.32 25.80 410.17 252
MEDIAN4D 24.93 42.34 0.14 6.02 13.17 25.38 424.30 252
MIN4RD 0.59 2.26 0 0.03 0.09 0.31 28.37 252
MAX4RD 25.25 166.8 0.04 3.1 7.14 16.87 2627.72 252
MEAN4RD 2.25 2.96 0.04 0.91 1.52 2.37 28.37 252
MEDIAN4RD 1.53 2.43 0.04 0.53 1.01 1.66 28.37 252
MIN4RDNOR 0.37 0.54 0 0.05 0.15 0.42 2.8 252
MAX4RDNOR 2.18 0.68 0.07 1.83 2.37 2.7 3 252
MEAN4RDNOR 1.11 0.46 0.07 0.8 1.08 1.33 2.8 252
MEDIAN4RDNOR 1.06 0.54 0.07 0.66 1.05 1.38 2.8 252
MIN4RDALT 0.61 2.29 0 0.03 0.1 0.32 28.54 252
MAX4RDALT 27.16 186.06 0.04 3.13 7.47 18.11 2933.56 252
MEAN4RDALT 2.35 3.08 0.04 0.96 1.62 2.48 28.54 252
MEDIAN4RDALT 1.59 2.46 0.04 0.56 1.08 1.7 28.54 252
MIN4DIFFP 1.83 4.55 0 0.19 0.58 1.58 57.15 252
MAX4DIFFP 16.09 11.96 0.3 8.81 13.53 20.12 77.43 252
MEAN4DIFFP 7.05 6.61 0.3 3.75 5.57 7.76 60.05 252
MEDIAN4DIFFP 6.8 7.49 0.24 3.19 5.09 7.32 73.53 252
MIN4KURTO −4 2.64 −6 −5.86 −5.28 −3.15 3.94 252
MAX4KURTO 2.99 1.68 −5.9 2.79 3.68 3.91 4 252
MEAN4KURTO 0.16 1.38 −5.9 −0.48 0.04 0.84 3.94 252
MEDIAN4KURTO 0.51 1.67 −5.9 −0.08 0.64 1.49 3.94 252
MIN4SPRD 0.08 0.08 0 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.81 252
MAX4SPD 0.26 0.16 0.05 0.16 0.21 0.32 0.89 252
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Predictors Mean Std Min LowerQ. Median UpperQ. Max N
MEAN4SPD 0.19 0.11 0.04 0.12 0.16 0.23 0.81 252
MEDIAN4SPD 0.19 0.12 0.04 0.12 0.16 0.24 0.89 252
MIN4KS 12.65 7.28 3.64 7.85 10.91 14.56 42.15 252
MAX4KS 64.97 79.07 4.15 24.21 44.41 76.85 862.88 252
MEAN4KS 19.96 11.22 4.15 12.92 17.51 23.75 97.43 252
MEDIAN4KS 16.85 8.23 3.87 11.12 15.26 20.29 59.16 252
Note: “Mean”, “Std”, “Min”, “Lower Q.”, “Median”, “Upper Q.”, “Max”, and “N” denote the mean, standard deviation,
minimum, lower quartile, median, upper quartile, maximum, and number of observations, respectively. The value for
”MEANBIDS”, ”STDBIDS”, ”D”, ”MIN3D”, ”MAX3D”, ”MEAN3D”, ”MEDIAN3D”, ”MIN4D”, ”MAX4D”, ”MEAN4D”
and ”MEDIAN4D” are expressed in thousand CHF. ”KS”, ”CV”, ”SPD”, ”RD”, ”RDNOR”, ”RDALT”, ”SKEW”, ”DIFFP”,
”KURTO”, ”D”, ”STDBIDS”, ”MEANBIDS” and ”NBRBIDS” denote the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic, the coefficient of
variation, the spread, the relative distance, the normalized distance, the alternative relative distance, the skewness statistic,
the percentage difference, the kurtosis statistic, the difference in absolute between the first and second lowest bids, the
standard deviation of the bids in a tender, the mean of the bids in a tender and the number of the bids in a tender,
respectively.
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Table 22: Descriptive statistics for incomplete bid-rigging cartels in sample 2
Predictors Mean Std Min LowerQ. Median UpperQ. Max N
NBRBIDS 7.77 2.47 4 6 8 10 13 223
MEANBIDS 405.24 372.35 27.84 149.78 302.21 535.40 3002.37 223
STDBIDS 30.96 37.64 1.63 9.65 19.51 33.19 270.82 223
CV 7.6 3.77 1.77 5.14 6.66 9.07 23.92 223
KURTO 0.44 2.08 −5.75 −0.94 0.04 1.47 6.97 223
SKEW −0.07 0.97 −2.59 −0.62 −0.08 0.46 2.57 223
SPD 0.26 0.16 0.05 0.16 0.21 0.31 0.89 223
D 20.13 36.04 0.08 4.13 8.90 21.08 351.83 223
RD 1.29 2.12 0.01 0.27 0.58 1.36 18.04 223
RDNOR 1.45 1.14 0.01 0.61 1.14 2.06 5.48 223
RDALT 2.3 3.24 0.01 0.58 1.17 2.83 20.74 223
DIFFP 6.3 9.13 0.03 1.88 3.69 6.78 73.53 223
KS 16.85 7.91 4.15 11.89 15.54 19.99 57.54 223
MIN3CV 1.47 1.22 0 0.62 1.15 1.93 7.05 223
MAX3CV 12.24 6.43 2.93 8 10.57 14.98 38.48 223
MEAN3CV 6.92 3.33 1.55 4.69 6.09 8.33 22.96 223
MEDIAN3CV 6.75 3.56 1.01 4.58 6 8.06 29.82 223
MIN3SKEW −1.63 0.29 −1.73 −1.73 −1.72 −1.68 0.62 223
MAX3SKEW 1.58 0.38 −1.1 1.68 1.72 1.73 1.73 223
MEAN3SKEW −0.04 0.45 −1.33 −0.28 −0.04 0.25 1.31 223
MEDIAN3SKEW −0.05 0.74 −1.69 −0.58 −0.06 0.45 1.73 223
MIN3D 2.76 5.42 0.00 0.38 1.17 2.87 56.23 223
MAX3D 69.79 84.97 2.38 20.13 42.35 79.53 670.57 223
MEAN3D 26.13 30.47 1.42 8.28 16.72 28.29 235.67 223
MEDIAN3D 23.11 25.43 1.52 7.92 14.63 26.60 171.87 223
MIN3RD 0.18 0.37 0 0.02 0.06 0.15 3.35 223
MAX3RD 1355.45 10617.14 0.92 14.74 37.36 128.17 122393.82 223
MEAN3RD 30.39 203.82 0.43 2.65 4.66 9.35 2742.11 223
MEDIAN3RD 1.92 1.72 0.26 1.06 1.5 2.14 18.63 223
MIN3RDNOR 0.18 0.25 0 0.03 0.08 0.19 1.41 223
MAX3RDNOR 1.85 0.2 0.79 1.82 1.93 1.98 2 223
MEAN3RDNOR 1.02 0.2 0.41 0.9 1.02 1.12 1.66 223
MEDIAN3RDNOR 1.02 0.28 0.3 0.85 1.02 1.2 1.85 223
MIN3RDALT 0.13 0.26 0 0.01 0.04 0.11 2.37 223
MAX3RDALT 958.45 7507.45 0.65 10.42 26.42 90.63 86545.5 223
MEAN3RDALT 21.49 144.12 0.3 1.88 3.29 6.61 1938.96 223
MEDIAN3RDALT 1.36 1.21 0.18 0.75 1.06 1.51 13.18 223
MIN3DIFFP 0.81 1.25 0 0.14 0.43 0.99 10.47 223
MAX3DIFFP 19.73 12.93 2.29 11.81 16.81 24.42 87.65 223
MEAN3DIFFP 7.59 5.58 1.39 4.82 6.35 8.75 49.6 223
MEDIAN3DIFFP 6.92 6.67 1.14 3.91 5.71 8.1 73.53 223
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Predictors Mean Std Min LowerQ. Median UpperQ. Max N
MIN3SPD 0.03 0.02 0 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.15 223
MAX3SPD 0.26 0.16 0.05 0.16 0.21 0.31 0.89 223
MEAN3SPD 0.15 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.13 0.18 0.62 223
MEDIAN3SPD 0.14 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.12 0.17 0.83 223
MIN3KS 10.9 6.01 3 6.98 9.7 12.52 34.52 223
MAX3KS 394.81 3645.21 14.27 52.14 87.43 161.06 54476.99 223
MEAN3KS 27.97 36.27 6.25 16 21.99 30.38 495.16 223
MEDIAN3KS 19.22 11.35 3.36 12.64 16.97 22.22 99.02 223
MIN4CV 2.8 2.48 0.12 1.2 2.17 3.87 23.92 223
MAX4CV 10.63 5.48 2.48 7.05 9.36 13.08 33.94 223
MEAN4CV 7.22 3.5 1.64 4.88 6.32 8.58 23.92 223
MEDIAN4CV 7.41 3.75 1.69 5.01 6.51 8.9 25.38 223
MIN4SKEW −1.51 0.71 −2 −1.95 −1.82 −1.42 1.84 223
MAX4SKEW 1.38 0.85 −1.96 1.23 1.82 1.94 2 223
MEAN4SKEW −0.06 0.64 −1.96 −0.4 −0.07 0.35 1.84 223
MEDIAN4SKEW −0.07 0.74 −1.96 −0.46 −0.04 0.29 1.84 223
MIN4D 3.82 8.45 0.00 0.43 1.43 3.77 96.23 223
MAX4D 58.39 72.08 0.18 16.06 37.52 68.97 535.26 223
MEAN4D 23.35 29.62 0.18 7.26 14.45 25.83 274.73 223
MEDIAN4D 23.01 32.93 0.14 6.07 13.49 25.40 351.83 223
MIN4RD 0.41 1.4 0 0.03 0.09 0.25 18.04 223
MAX4RD 27.52 177.13 0.04 3.91 7.86 17.75 2627.72 223
MEAN4RD 2.19 2.53 0.04 0.96 1.62 2.37 24.7 223
MEDIAN4RD 1.42 1.77 0.04 0.57 1.02 1.52 18.04 223
MIN4RDNOR 0.32 0.46 0 0.04 0.14 0.36 2.7 223
MAX4RDNOR 2.25 0.61 0.07 2 2.42 2.71 3 223
MEAN4RDNOR 1.11 0.42 0.07 0.82 1.09 1.3 2.7 223
MEDIAN4RDNOR 1.06 0.51 0.07 0.69 1.06 1.31 2.7 223
MIN4RDALT 0.42 1.42 0 0.03 0.09 0.27 18.05 223
MAX4RDALT 29.63 197.6 0.04 4 8.35 18.57 2933.56 223
MEAN4RDALT 2.29 2.67 0.04 1.02 1.72 2.49 27.4 223
MEDIAN4RDALT 1.48 1.8 0.04 0.6 1.1 1.55 18.05 223
MIN4DIFFP 1.48 4.34 0 0.17 0.51 1.23 57.15 223
MAX4DIFFP 16.59 11.97 0.3 9.6 13.87 20.28 77.43 223
MEAN4DIFFP 7 6.68 0.3 3.97 5.51 7.55 60.05 223
MEDIAN4DIFFP 6.74 7.66 0.24 3.24 5.08 7.23 73.53 223
MIN4KURTO −4.32 2.38 −6 −5.88 −5.48 −3.92 3.85 223
MAX4KURTO 3.16 1.43 −5.75 3.04 3.74 3.91 4 223
MEAN4KURTO 0.15 1.23 −5.75 −0.48 0.04 0.79 3.85 223
MEDIAN4KURTO 0.52 1.56 −5.75 −0.05 0.63 1.42 3.85 223
MIN4SPD 0.07 0.07 0 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.81 223
MAX4SPD 0.26 0.16 0.05 0.16 0.21 0.31 0.89 223
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Predictors Mean Std Min LowerQ. Median UpperQ. Max N
MEAN4SPD 0.18 0.11 0.04 0.12 0.15 0.22 0.81 223
MEDIAN4SPD 0.19 0.11 0.04 0.12 0.16 0.22 0.89 223
MIN4KS 12.55 7.02 3.64 7.95 11.06 14.33 40.78 223
MAX4KS 69.75 82.58 4.15 26.17 46.65 84.1 862.88 223
MEAN4KS 20.49 11.41 4.15 13.41 18.45 23.97 97.43 223
MEDIAN4KS 17.14 8.1 3.87 11.75 15.89 20.31 59.16 223
Note: “Mean”, “Std”, “Min”, “Lower Q.”, “Median”, “Upper Q.”, “Max”, and “N” denote the mean, standard deviation,
minimum, lower quartile, median, upper quartile, maximum, and number of observations, respectively. The value for
”MEANBIDS”, ”STDBIDS”, ”D”, ”MIN3D”, ”MAX3D”, ”MEAN3D”, ”MEDIAN3D”, ”MIN4D”, ”MAX4D”, ”MEAN4D”
and ”MEDIAN4D” are expressed in thousand CHF. ”KS”, ”CV”, ”SPD”, ”RD”, ”RDNOR”, ”RDALT”, ”SKEW”, ”DIFFP”,
”KURTO”, ”D”, ”STDBIDS”, ”MEANBIDS” and ”NBRBIDS” denote the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic, the coefficient of
variation, the spread, the relative distance, the normalized distance, the alternative relative distance, the skewness statistic,
the percentage difference, the kurtosis statistic, the difference in absolute between the first and second lowest bids, the
standard deviation of the bids in a tender, the mean of the bids in a tender and the number of the bids in a tender,
respectively.
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Table 23: Descriptive statistics for incomplete bid-rigging cartels in sample 3
Predictors Mean Std Min LowerQ. Median UpperQ. Max N
NBRBIDS 8.5 2.15 5 7 8 10 13 173
MEANBIDS 439.36 388.89 30.24 182.64 329.61 572.01 3002.37 173
STDBIDS 33.50 40.38 2.01 11.89 20.48 33.44 270.82 173
CV 7.54 3.26 1.77 5.24 6.76 9.12 21.7 173
KURTO 0.46 1.97 −2.69 −0.88 −0.09 1.23 6.97 173
SKEW −0.07 0.95 −2.59 −0.56 −0.08 0.43 2.57 173
SPD 0.26 0.14 0.06 0.17 0.22 0.31 0.88 173
D 21.95 39.01 0.08 4.53 9.46 22.94 351.83 173
RD 1.14 1.76 0.01 0.29 0.58 1.19 12.47 173
RDNOR 1.54 1.17 0.02 0.66 1.17 2.17 5.48 173
RDALT 2.33 3.2 0.02 0.63 1.19 2.81 20.74 173
DIFFP 5.91 7.48 0.1 2.13 3.7 6.74 45.42 173
KS 16.55 7.64 6.19 11.84 15.48 19.69 57.54 173
MIN3CV 1.2 0.9 0 0.52 1.03 1.56 3.95 173
MAX3CV 12.6 5.86 2.93 8.78 10.99 15.19 38.48 173
MEAN3CV 6.82 2.83 1.55 4.79 6.11 8.34 16.5 173
MEDIAN3CV 6.51 2.79 1.01 4.67 5.92 8.02 14.2 173
MIN3SKEW −1.69 0.12 −1.73 −1.73 −1.73 −1.71 −0.88 173
MAX3SKEW 1.67 0.15 0.73 1.69 1.73 1.73 1.73 173
MEAN3SKEW −0.03 0.39 −1.02 −0.22 −0.04 0.23 0.88 173
MEDIAN3SKEW −0.03 0.69 −1.48 −0.47 −0.06 0.41 1.73 173
MIN3D 2.35 4.05 0.00 0.34 1.03 2.40 30.19 173
MAX3D 78.60 90.43 3.70 24.82 51.54 89.92 670.57 173
MEAN3D 28.43 32.44 1.58 9.40 17.96 32.97 235.67 173
MEDIAN3D 24.31 26.46 1.52 8.53 15.79 26.36 171.87 173
MIN3RD 0.11 0.19 0 0.02 0.04 0.12 1.76 173
MAX3RD 1737.96 12034.74 2.68 20.39 48.9 163.12 122393.82 173
MEAN3RD 37.63 231.03 0.92 2.91 5.15 9.8 2742.11 173
MEDIAN3RD 1.72 1.05 0.32 1.07 1.48 1.95 6.05 173
MIN3RDNOR 0.12 0.16 0 0.02 0.06 0.16 1 173
MAX3RDNOR 1.9 0.13 1.31 1.87 1.94 1.98 2 173
MEAN3RDNOR 1.02 0.18 0.61 0.91 1.03 1.11 1.46 173
MEDIAN3RDNOR 1.02 0.25 0.37 0.86 1.02 1.16 1.62 173
MIN3RDALT 0.08 0.14 0 0.01 0.03 0.09 1.25 173
MAX3RDALT 1228.92 8509.85 1.9 14.42 34.57 115.34 86545.5 173
MEAN3RDALT 26.61 163.36 0.65 2.06 3.64 6.93 1938.96 173
MEDIAN3RDALT 1.22 0.74 0.22 0.76 1.05 1.38 4.28 173
MIN3DIFFP 0.58 0.71 0 0.12 0.37 0.81 4.49 173
MAX3DIFFP 20.62 11.43 3.84 13.06 17.99 25.01 72.01 173
MEAN3DIFFP 7.33 3.89 1.55 5 6.42 8.68 22.8 173
MEDIAN3DIFFP 6.18 3.26 1.33 3.91 5.67 7.45 21.76 173
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Predictors Mean Std Min LowerQ. Median UpperQ. Max N
MIN3SPD 0.02 0.02 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.08 173
MAX3SPD 0.26 0.14 0.06 0.17 0.22 0.31 0.88 173
MEAN3SPD 0.14 0.07 0.03 0.1 0.13 0.18 0.38 173
MEDIAN3SPD 0.13 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.12 0.17 0.3 173
MIN3KS 10.03 5.06 3 6.91 9.18 11.63 34.52 173
MAX3KS 489.07 4136.34 25.56 63.95 97.45 192.63 54476.99 173
MEAN3KS 29.3 40.7 9.3 16.34 21.99 30.15 495.16 173
MEDIAN3KS 19.58 12.05 7.28 12.7 17.13 21.76 99.02 173
MIN4CV 2.14 1.45 0.12 1.03 1.76 2.94 8.25 173
MAX4CV 11.02 5.04 2.48 7.92 9.6 13.24 33.94 173
MEAN4CV 7.12 2.98 1.64 4.99 6.32 8.58 18.01 173
MEDIAN4CV 7.27 3.09 1.69 5.15 6.57 8.91 17.17 173
MIN4SKEW −1.69 0.44 −2 −1.96 −1.88 −1.64 −0.04 173
MAX4SKEW 1.62 0.52 −0.4 1.49 1.84 1.95 2 173
MEAN4SKEW −0.05 0.55 −1.42 −0.34 −0.07 0.31 1.32 173
MEDIAN4SKEW −0.06 0.67 −1.86 −0.42 −0.05 0.27 1.72 173
MIN4D 2.86 4.84 0.00 0.34 1.13 3.02 30.28 173
MAX4D 66.68 76.42 1.56 20.02 43.87 78.43 535.26 173
MEAN4D 25.49 31.63 1.22 8.73 15.85 27.51 274.73 173
MEDIAN4D 24.96 35.20 0.96 7.98 15.12 27.02 351.83 173
MIN4RD 0.16 0.26 0 0.02 0.06 0.17 1.93 173
MAX4RD 33.76 200.71 1.09 5.32 10.34 20.54 2627.72 173
MEAN4RD 2.22 2.44 0.35 1.04 1.68 2.38 24.7 173
MEDIAN4RD 1.31 1.24 0.16 0.69 1.05 1.39 9.81 173
MIN4RDNOR 0.2 0.25 0 0.03 0.1 0.25 1.51 173
MAX4RDNOR 2.42 0.44 1.07 2.2 2.53 2.75 3 173
MEAN4RDNOR 1.11 0.35 0.43 0.85 1.1 1.28 2.06 173
MEDIAN4RDNOR 1.07 0.44 0.22 0.79 1.07 1.25 2.5 173
MIN4RDALT 0.16 0.26 0 0.02 0.07 0.18 2.03 173
MAX4RDALT 36.41 223.95 1.1 5.54 10.76 21.56 2933.56 173
MEAN4RDALT 2.31 2.61 0.37 1.09 1.75 2.51 27.4 173
MEDIAN4RDALT 1.37 1.27 0.16 0.72 1.11 1.43 9.91 173
MIN4DIFFP 0.71 0.9 0 0.13 0.41 0.98 6.52 173
MAX4DIFFP 17.69 10.69 3.03 11.06 15.55 21.32 70.09 173
MEAN4DIFFP 6.67 4.5 1.18 4.22 5.62 7.44 26.42 173
MEDIAN4DIFFP 6.33 5.07 0.98 3.44 5.23 7.15 34.35 173
MIN4KURTO −4.9 1.6 −6 −5.92 −5.55 −4.6 1.44 173
MAX4KURTO 3.56 0.61 1 3.49 3.82 3.93 4 173
MEAN4KURTO 0.17 0.89 −1.78 −0.46 −0.05 0.63 3.19 173
MEDIAN4KURTO 0.63 1.19 −4.42 0 0.63 1.34 3.57 173
MIN4SPD 0.05 0.03 0 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.2 173
MAX4SPD 0.26 0.14 0.06 0.17 0.22 0.31 0.88 173
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Predictors Mean Std Min LowerQ. Median UpperQ. Max N
MEAN4SPD 0.18 0.08 0.04 0.12 0.15 0.22 0.48 173
MEDIAN4SPD 0.18 0.09 0.04 0.12 0.16 0.22 0.48 173
MIN4KS 11.44 5.86 3.64 7.8 10.66 12.95 40.78 173
MAX4KS 81.53 89.76 12.72 34.28 57.17 97.8 862.88 173
MEAN4KS 20.95 12.1 8.31 13.75 18.47 23.97 97.43 173
MEDIAN4KS 16.96 7.85 5.9 11.68 15.89 19.94 59.16 173
Note: “Mean”, “Std”, “Min”, “Lower Q.”, “Median”, “Upper Q.”, “Max”, and “N” denote the mean, standard deviation,
minimum, lower quartile, median, upper quartile, maximum, and number of observations, respectively. The value for
”MEANBIDS”, ”STDBIDS”, ”D”, ”MIN3D”, ”MAX3D”, ”MEAN3D”, ”MEDIAN3D”, ”MIN4D”, ”MAX4D”, ”MEAN4D”
and ”MEDIAN4D” are expressed in thousand CHF. ”KS”, ”CV”, ”SPD”, ”RD”, ”RDNOR”, ”RDALT”, ”SKEW”, ”DIFFP”,
”KURTO”, ”D”, ”STDBIDS”, ”MEANBIDS” and ”NBRBIDS” denote the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic, the coefficient of
variation, the spread, the relative distance, the normalized distance, the alternative relative distance, the skewness statistic,
the percentage difference, the kurtosis statistic, the difference in absolute between the first and second lowest bids, the
standard deviation of the bids in a tender, the mean of the bids in a tender and the number of the bids in a tender,
respectively.
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Table 24: Descriptive statistics for incomplete bid-rigging cartels in sample 4
Predictors Mean Std Min LowerQ. Median UpperQ. Max N
NBRBIDS 9.08 1.87 6 8 9 11 13 135
MEANBIDS 448.31 384.31 41.46 219.13 337.02 567.20 3002.37 135
STDBIDS 31.74 34.92 2.26 13.09 21.49 32.73 270.82 135
CV 7.19 2.93 1.77 5.22 6.3 8.62 18.9 135
KURTO 0.47 1.97 −2.26 −0.88 −0.18 1.18 6.97 135
SKEW −0.09 0.94 −2.59 −0.54 −0.12 0.44 2.57 135
SPD 0.26 0.13 0.06 0.17 0.21 0.31 0.76 135
D 22.85 42.70 0.26 4.76 9.34 22.35 351.83 135
RD 1.05 1.5 0.01 0.3 0.57 1.12 10.58 135
RDNOR 1.6 1.18 0.04 0.7 1.22 2.28 5.48 135
RDALT 2.33 3.02 0.04 0.67 1.27 2.86 20.74 135
DIFFP 5.82 7.82 0.1 2.03 3.36 6.58 45.42 135
KS 16.91 7.21 6.62 12.48 16.29 19.83 57.54 135
MIN3CV 0.94 0.62 0 0.43 0.82 1.28 3.04 135
MAX3CV 12.33 5.32 3.36 8.87 10.64 15.02 32.54 135
MEAN3CV 6.47 2.56 1.55 4.69 5.85 7.72 15.38 135
MEDIAN3CV 6.07 2.49 1.01 4.52 5.67 7.29 13.93 135
MIN3SKEW −1.71 0.07 −1.73 −1.73 −1.73 −1.72 −1.13 135
MAX3SKEW 1.69 0.1 0.93 1.71 1.73 1.73 1.73 135
MEAN3SKEW −0.04 0.37 −1.02 −0.24 −0.04 0.21 0.87 135
MEDIAN3SKEW −0.03 0.66 −1.45 −0.47 −0.07 0.4 1.73 135
MIN3D 1.96 3.70 0.00 0.30 0.87 1.99 30.19 135
MAX3D 81.04 93.45 5.67 30.62 55.61 88.77 670.57 135
MEAN3D 28.50 33.46 2.14 11.22 18.00 30.40 235.67 135
MEDIAN3D 23.43 25.63 2.24 9.00 16.39 25.58 171.87 135
MIN3RD 0.09 0.18 0 0.02 0.04 0.1 1.76 135
MAX3RD 2203.8 13597.91 3.46 27.6 62.53 192.17 122393.82 135
MEAN3RD 45.46 261.04 0.92 3.13 5.48 10.57 2742.11 135
MEDIAN3RD 1.69 0.96 0.45 1.08 1.5 1.95 5.61 135
MIN3RDNOR 0.1 0.14 0 0.02 0.06 0.13 1 135
MAX3RDNOR 1.92 0.1 1.42 1.91 1.96 1.99 2 135
MEAN3RDNOR 1.02 0.17 0.61 0.92 1.04 1.11 1.46 135
MEDIAN3RDNOR 1.02 0.24 0.49 0.87 1.02 1.16 1.6 135
MIN3RDALT 0.06 0.13 0 0.01 0.03 0.07 1.25 135
MAX3RDALT 1558.32 9615.17 2.44 19.52 44.22 135.89 86545.5 135
MEAN3RDALT 32.15 184.58 0.65 2.22 3.88 7.48 1938.96 135
MEDIAN3RDALT 1.2 0.68 0.32 0.76 1.06 1.38 3.97 135
MIN3DIFFP 0.44 0.47 0 0.11 0.27 0.56 2.32 135
MAX3DIFFP 20.71 11.13 3.84 13.33 17.81 25.2 63.38 135
MEAN3DIFFP 7.11 3.99 1.55 4.82 6.24 8.15 22.8 135
MEDIAN3DIFFP 5.68 2.93 1.33 3.81 5.29 6.99 21.76 135
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Predictors Mean Std Min LowerQ. Median UpperQ. Max N
MIN3SPD 0.02 0.01 0 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.06 135
MAX3SPD 0.26 0.13 0.06 0.17 0.21 0.31 0.76 135
MEAN3SPD 0.14 0.06 0.03 0.1 0.12 0.16 0.35 135
MEDIAN3SPD 0.12 0.05 0.02 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.3 135
MIN3KS 9.9 4.37 3.47 7 9.69 11.51 30.19 135
MAX3KS 603.24 4679.33 32.93 77.85 122.26 231.34 54477 135
MEAN3KS 30.89 43.76 10.24 18.79 23.63 31.72 495.16 135
MEDIAN3KS 20.34 11.39 7.28 14.06 17.92 22.59 99.02 135
MIN4CV 1.7 1.03 0.12 0.91 1.5 2.18 5.53 135
MAX4CV 10.83 4.53 2.8 8 9.4 13.15 28.01 135
MEAN4CV 6.76 2.69 1.64 4.93 6.08 8 16.54 135
MEDIAN4CV 6.88 2.88 1.69 5.01 6.17 8.11 17.17 135
MIN4SKEW −1.81 0.29 −2 −1.97 −1.92 −1.76 −0.28 135
MAX4SKEW 1.72 0.4 −0.26 1.7 1.86 1.96 2 135
MEAN4SKEW −0.06 0.52 −1.37 −0.33 −0.1 0.28 1.18 135
MEDIAN4SKEW −0.07 0.65 −1.69 −0.38 −0.07 0.26 1.72 135
MIN4D 2.38 4.46 0.00 0.33 1.04 2.48 30.28 135
MAX4D 69.99 79.50 5.47 25.08 47.56 78.76 535.26 135
MEAN4D 25.93 33.56 1.39 9.45 16.57 26.24 274.73 135
MEDIAN4D 25.13 37.53 0.96 7.99 16.21 25.40 351.83 135
MIN4RD 0.12 0.19 0 0.02 0.05 0.14 1.47 135
MAX4RD 41.1 226.79 1.09 6.95 13.21 23.81 2627.72 135
MEAN4RD 2.27 2.46 0.35 1.11 1.72 2.51 24.7 135
MEDIAN4RD 1.25 0.95 0.16 0.69 1.06 1.36 5.95 135
MIN4RDNOR 0.16 0.19 0 0.03 0.09 0.21 1.02 135
MAX4RDNOR 2.53 0.35 1.07 2.34 2.61 2.79 3 135
MEAN4RDNOR 1.11 0.33 0.43 0.87 1.11 1.28 2.05 135
MEDIAN4RDNOR 1.07 0.42 0.22 0.8 1.07 1.25 2.27 135
MIN4RDALT 0.12 0.17 0 0.02 0.06 0.15 1.04 135
MAX4RDALT 44.43 253.08 1.1 7.07 13.34 26.04 2933.56 135
MEAN4RDALT 2.37 2.65 0.37 1.16 1.79 2.62 27.4 135
MEDIAN4RDALT 1.31 1 0.16 0.73 1.11 1.43 6.3 135
MIN4DIFFP 0.53 0.59 0 0.12 0.37 0.81 3.21 135
MAX4DIFFP 18.02 10.4 3.03 11.48 15.55 22.07 56.74 135
MEAN4DIFFP 6.55 4.74 1.18 4.08 5.51 7.01 26.42 135
MEDIAN4DIFFP 6.13 5.32 0.98 3.26 4.82 6.87 34.35 135
MIN4KURTO −5.26 1.06 −6 −5.93 −5.69 −5.08 −0.16 135
MAX4KURTO 3.71 0.39 2.18 3.62 3.86 3.95 4 135
MEAN4KURTO 0.16 0.8 −1.21 −0.4 −0.07 0.62 2.41 135
MEDIAN4KURTO 0.72 0.98 −3.63 0.06 0.68 1.38 3.11 135
MIN4SPD 0.04 0.02 0 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.13 135
MAX4SPD 0.26 0.13 0.06 0.17 0.21 0.31 0.76 135
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Predictors Mean Std Min LowerQ. Median UpperQ. Max N
MEAN4SPD 0.17 0.08 0.04 0.12 0.15 0.2 0.45 135
MEDIAN4SPD 0.17 0.08 0.04 0.12 0.15 0.2 0.48 135
MIN4KS 11.21 5.03 4.25 7.95 10.99 12.79 36.12 135
MAX4KS 91.93 91.08 18.25 46.29 67.17 110.97 862.88 135
MEAN4KS 21.62 10.72 8.43 15.07 19.14 24.63 97.28 135
MEDIAN4KS 17.62 7.69 5.9 13.03 16.55 20.31 59.16 135
Note: “Mean”, “Std”, “Min”, “Lower Q.”, “Median”, “Upper Q.”, “Max”, and “N” denote the mean, standard deviation,
minimum, lower quartile, median, upper quartile, maximum, and number of observations, respectively. The value for
”MEANBIDS”, ”STDBIDS”, ”D”, ”MIN3D”, ”MAX3D”, ”MEAN3D”, ”MEDIAN3D”, ”MIN4D”, ”MAX4D”, ”MEAN4D”
and ”MEDIAN4D” are expressed in thousand CHF. ”KS”, ”CV”, ”SPD”, ”RD”, ”RDNOR”, ”RDALT”, ”SKEW”, ”DIFFP”,
”KURTO”, ”D”, ”STDBIDS”, ”MEANBIDS” and ”NBRBIDS” denote the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic, the coefficient of
variation, the spread, the relative distance, the normalized distance, the alternative relative distance, the skewness statistic,
the percentage difference, the kurtosis statistic, the difference in absolute between the first and second lowest bids, the
standard deviation of the bids in a tender, the mean of the bids in a tender and the number of the bids in a tender,
respectively.
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Table 25: Descriptive statistics for incomplete bid-rigging cartels in sample 5
Predictors Mean Std Min LowerQ. Median UpperQ. Max N
NBRBIDS 9.42 1.81 7 8 9 11 13 104
MEANBIDS 434.09 290.66 86.12 232.84 345.62 534.23 1559.96 104
STDBIDS 29.66 26.44 4.58 15.43 21.89 32.70 191.92 104
CV 6.87 2.53 1.77 5.19 6.22 8.05 14.4 104
KURTO 0.52 2.06 −2.26 −0.89 −0.15 1.17 6.97 104
SKEW −0.1 0.94 −2.59 −0.62 −0.16 0.43 2.57 104
SPD 0.25 0.12 0.06 0.18 0.21 0.28 0.66 104
D 23.61 46.99 0.26 5.33 8.88 21.49 351.83 104
RD 1.03 1.56 0.01 0.3 0.57 1.09 10.58 104
RDNOR 1.65 1.24 0.04 0.72 1.25 2.39 5.48 104
RDALT 2.4 3.23 0.04 0.69 1.29 3.01 20.74 104
DIFFP 5.91 8.38 0.1 1.77 3.22 6.14 45.42 104
KS 17.25 7.04 6.93 13.12 16.66 19.81 57.54 104
MIN3CV 0.86 0.6 0 0.38 0.75 1.21 3.04 104
MAX3CV 11.97 4.77 3.36 8.96 10.54 13.64 26.24 104
MEAN3CV 6.19 2.19 1.55 4.7 5.74 7.34 12.47 104
MEDIAN3CV 5.71 2.04 1.55 4.39 5.55 6.88 11.38 104
MIN3SKEW −1.71 0.08 −1.73 −1.73 −1.73 −1.72 −1.13 104
MAX3SKEW 1.71 0.05 1.48 1.71 1.73 1.73 1.73 104
MEAN3SKEW −0.04 0.35 −1.02 −0.25 −0.05 0.16 0.87 104
MEDIAN3SKEW −0.05 0.62 −1.45 −0.47 −0.07 0.36 1.32 104
MIN3D 1.47 2.09 0.00 0.31 0.81 1.65 13.14 104
MAX3D 76.95 75.24 9.36 35.44 56.91 86.41 530.84 104
MEAN3D 27.35 30.06 3.76 12.85 18.95 28.64 235.67 104
MEDIAN3D 21.88 21.69 2.24 10.65 16.45 24.90 144.14 104
MIN3RD 0.06 0.07 0 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.34 104
MAX3RD 2673.49 15390.37 3.46 35.67 75.98 246.78 122393.82 104
MEAN3RD 53.44 294.68 0.92 3.42 5.6 10.88 2742.11 104
MEDIAN3RD 1.66 0.88 0.45 1.11 1.48 1.95 5.61 104
MIN3RDNOR 0.08 0.08 0 0.02 0.06 0.11 0.39 104
MAX3RDNOR 1.93 0.09 1.42 1.92 1.96 1.99 2 104
MEAN3RDNOR 1.02 0.16 0.61 0.92 1.04 1.11 1.46 104
MEDIAN3RDNOR 1.02 0.23 0.49 0.88 1.02 1.16 1.6 104
MIN3RDALT 0.04 0.05 0 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.24 104
MAX3RDALT 1890.44 10882.63 2.44 25.22 53.73 174.5 86545.5 104
MEAN3RDALT 37.79 208.37 0.65 2.42 3.96 7.69 1938.96 104
MEDIAN3RDALT 1.17 0.62 0.32 0.78 1.05 1.38 3.97 104
MIN3DIFFP 0.37 0.4 0 0.09 0.24 0.5 2.32 104
MAX3DIFFP 20.4 11.4 3.84 13.56 17.28 24.31 63.38 104
MEAN3DIFFP 6.93 4.04 1.55 4.74 5.94 7.75 22.8 104
MEDIAN3DIFFP 5.4 2.68 1.33 3.54 5 6.68 14.62 104
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Predictors Mean Std Min LowerQ. Median UpperQ. Max N
MIN3SPD 0.02 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.06 104
MAX3SPD 0.25 0.12 0.06 0.18 0.21 0.28 0.66 104
MEAN3SPD 0.13 0.05 0.03 0.1 0.12 0.15 0.3 104
MEDIAN3SPD 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.25 104
MIN3KS 9.91 4.06 3.91 7.59 9.79 11.48 30.19 104
MAX3KS 748.1 5328.42 32.93 82.68 133.82 260.68 54476.99 104
MEAN3KS 32.57 48.85 11.03 20.32 24.65 32.78 495.16 104
MEDIAN3KS 20.44 8.91 9.05 14.76 18.19 22.87 65.09 104
MIN4CV 1.54 0.97 0.12 0.85 1.34 2.04 5.53 104
MAX4CV 10.53 4.01 2.8 8.13 9.12 12.21 21.92 104
MEAN4CV 6.46 2.3 1.64 4.9 5.96 7.61 13.1 104
MEDIAN4CV 6.52 2.52 1.69 4.99 6.07 7.47 17.17 104
MIN4SKEW −1.82 0.31 −2 −1.98 −1.94 −1.82 −0.28 104
MAX4SKEW 1.78 0.31 0.11 1.75 1.88 1.96 2 104
MEAN4SKEW −0.06 0.5 −1.37 −0.34 −0.09 0.24 1.18 104
MEDIAN4SKEW −0.07 0.62 −1.69 −0.38 −0.07 0.24 1.72 104
MIN4D 1.95 3.57 0.00 0.31 0.93 2.26 30.28 104
MAX4D 68.42 69.32 8.37 31.49 50.56 780.10 495.98 104
MEAN4D 25.58 33.77 2.31 10.61 17.47 25.20 274.73 104
MEDIAN4D 24.81 39.62 0.96 8.97 15.70 23.58 351.83 104
MIN4RD 0.09 0.1 0 0.02 0.05 0.11 0.45 104
MAX4RD 49.4 257.96 1.09 8.05 15.98 26.88 2627.72 104
MEAN4RD 2.33 2.67 0.35 1.15 1.76 2.51 24.7 104
MEDIAN4RD 1.24 0.92 0.16 0.74 1.07 1.35 5.95 104
MIN4RDNOR 0.13 0.14 0 0.03 0.09 0.18 0.58 104
MAX4RDNOR 2.56 0.37 1.07 2.44 2.67 2.81 3 104
MEAN4RDNOR 1.11 0.31 0.43 0.92 1.12 1.28 2.05 104
MEDIAN4RDNOR 1.07 0.4 0.22 0.84 1.08 1.25 2.27 104
MIN4RDALT 0.1 0.11 0 0.02 0.06 0.13 0.48 104
MAX4RDALT 53.65 287.9 1.1 8.68 16.19 29.49 2933.56 104
MEAN4RDALT 2.46 2.92 0.37 1.19 1.81 2.61 27.4 104
MEDIAN4RDALT 1.3 0.98 0.16 0.78 1.12 1.43 6.3 104
MIN4DIFFP 0.46 0.52 0 0.1 0.31 0.6 2.5 104
MAX4DIFFP 18.1 10.77 3.03 11.85 15.64 20.51 56.74 104
MEAN4DIFFP 6.47 4.92 1.18 3.87 5.34 6.87 26.42 104
MEDIAN4DIFFP 5.98 5.32 0.98 3.21 4.61 6.49 34.35 104
MIN4KURTO −5.39 0.94 −6 −5.94 −5.77 −5.33 −1.12 104
MAX4KURTO 3.75 0.33 2.27 3.66 3.88 3.95 4 104
MEAN4KURTO 0.17 0.79 −1.07 −0.4 −0.06 0.56 2.41 104
MEDIAN4KURTO 0.71 0.98 −3.63 0.11 0.62 1.3 3.11 104
MIN4SPD 0.03 0.02 0 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.13 104
MAX4SPD 0.25 0.12 0.06 0.18 0.21 0.28 0.66 104
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Predictors Mean Std Min LowerQ. Median UpperQ. Max N
MEAN4SPD 0.16 0.07 0.04 0.12 0.14 0.19 0.39 104
MEDIAN4SPD 0.16 0.07 0.04 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.48 104
MIN4KS 11.18 4.58 4.66 8.45 11.24 12.71 36.12 104
MAX4KS 101.52 99.91 18.25 49.53 75.09 118.27 862.88 104
MEAN4KS 22.21 10.63 9.43 16.22 19.85 25.26 97.28 104
MEDIAN4KS 18.1 7.29 5.9 13.93 17.06 20.66 59.16 104
Note: “Mean”, “Std”, “Min”, “Lower Q.”, “Median”, “Upper Q.”, “Max”, and “N” denote the mean, standard deviation,
minimum, lower quartile, median, upper quartile, maximum, and number of observations, respectively. The value for
”MEANBIDS”, ”STDBIDS”, ”D”, ”MIN3D”, ”MAX3D”, ”MEAN3D”, ”MEDIAN3D”, ”MIN4D”, ”MAX4D”, ”MEAN4D”
and ”MEDIAN4D” are expressed in thousand CHF. ”KS”, ”CV”, ”SPD”, ”RD”, ”RDNOR”, ”RDALT”, ”SKEW”, ”DIFFP”,
”KURTO”, ”D”, ”STDBIDS”, ”MEANBIDS” and ”NBRBIDS” denote the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic, the coefficient of
variation, the spread, the relative distance, the normalized distance, the alternative relative distance, the skewness statistic,
the percentage difference, the kurtosis statistic, the difference in absolute between the first and second lowest bids, the
standard deviation of the bids in a tender, the mean of the bids in a tender and the number of the bids in a tender,
respectively.
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Appendix 3: Classification tree adjusting the benchmarking rule of Imhof et al. (2018)
in the Swiss data in sample only with complete cartels
Figure 3: Adjusted classification tree
Appendix 4: Details about lasso regression and the ensemble method
We subsequently discuss in more detail the machine learning approaches of the lasso regression and
ensemble method applied by Huber and Imhof (2019). Similar to the random forest, the lasso regres-
sion and ensemble method require randomly splitting the data into training (used for estimating the
model parameters) and test data (used for out of sample prediction and performance evaluation).
Again, our training and test samples contain 75% and 25% of the observations, respectively. Lasso
regression corresponds to a penalized logit regression, where the penalty term restricts the sum of
absolute coefficients on the regressors. Coefficients of less predictive variables shrink towards or
even exactly to zero depending on the penalty term. Therefore, lasso regression may perform pre-
dictor selection. The estimation of the lasso logit coefficients is based on the following optimization
problem:
max
β0,β

n∑
i=1
yi
β0 +
p∑
j=1
βjxij
− log
(
1+ e
β0+
∑p
j=1 βjxij
)−λ
p∑
j=1
|βj |
 . (16)
where β0 denotes intercept and slope coefficients on the predictors, β the slope coefficients on
the predictors, x the vector of predictors, i indexes an observation in our data set (with n being
the number of observations), j indexes a predictor (with p being the number of predictors), and
λ a penalty term larger than zero. We use the same predictors as described in the main text for
the different models. In our application, we use the hdm package by Chernozhukov et al. (2016) for
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the statistical software R. We apply 15-fold cross-validation to select the penalty term λ based on
minimizes the mean squared error of prediction.
For the ensemble method, we apply as in Huber and Imhof (2019) the “SuperLearner” package
for “R” by van der Laan et al. (2008) with default values for bagged regression tree, random forest,
and neural network algorithms in the “ipredbagg”, “cforest”, and “nnet” packages, respectively. En-
semble method also relies on training data for estimating the model parameters and test data for
prediction and performance evaluation. However, any estimation step now consists of a weighted
average of bagged classification trees, random forest and neural networks. Bagged trees consist of
estimating single trees (rather than random forests) repeatedly using the outcome residuals of the
respective previous tree as outcome. Rather than splitting the predictor space, neural networks aim
at fitting a system of nonlinear functions that models the influence of the predictors on collusion in
a flexible way. To do so, we model the association between the predictors and the outcomes via a net-
work of non-linear intermediate functions, so-called hidden notes. Several layers of hidden nodes
allow modelling associations as well as interactions between the predictors in a flexible way, with
more nodes and layers increasing the variance but reducing the bias.
Appendix 5: Results for the statistical tests between the simulated bids and the compet-
itive bids in the Ticino case
In the following, we test if the simulated competitive bids are similar to the competitive bids of the
post-cartel period. We calculate the screens for the five simulated competitive bids for each collusive
tender. We test if the screens differ from the screens calculated with the competitive bids of the post-
cartel period. Since the screens are not normally distributed, we apply non-parametric tests to our
data, which do not assume any particular distribution in the test procedures (see also Imhof et al.,
2018; Imhof , 2020). First, we apply the Mann-Whitney test (also called the Wilcoxon rank sum
test).29 To insure the robustness of the results, we second use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, a more
general test examining for any kind of differences between samples.30
Table 26 indicates the test results. We find no rejection for all the tests (at the 5% significance
level), except for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test applied to the percentage difference (DIFFP). To sum
up, the screens calculated with the simulated competitive bids do not significantly differ with the
screens calculated with the ”real” competitive bids of the post-cartel period. Therefore, the simulated
competitive bids exhibit more or less the same statistical pattern as the ”real” competitive bids. This
result indicates that our simulation process adequately generates competitive bids for the purpose of
our analyses.
29See Rice (2007) chapter 11, page 435 ff.; Hollander et al. (2014) chapter 4, page 115 ff.
30See Hollander et al. (2014) chapter 5, page 190 ff.
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Table 26: Statistical tests for the screens calculated with the simulated competitive bids against the
competitive bids of the post-cartel period
Screens z-statistic p-value MW KSa p-value KS
CV -1.14 0.2525 1.24 0.0934
KURTO -0.93 0.3545 1.04 0.2311
SPD -0.45 0.6541 1.12 0.1623
DIFFP -1.64 0.1014 1.90 0.0015
SKEW -0.06 0.9524 0.87 0.4377
RD -0.10 0.9215 0.78 0.5820
RDNOR 0.1290 0.9874 0.83 0.4913
RDALT 0.1179 0.9061 0.77 0.5901
KS 1.31 0.1890 1.21 0.1084
Note: ”Screens”, ”z-statistic”, ”p-value MW” denote the screens tested, the z-statistic of the Mann-Whitney test and the
p-value of the Mann-Whitney test, respectively. ”KSa” and ”p-value KS” denote the asymptotic Kolmogorov-Smirnov
statistic and the p-value of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, respectively.
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